An Argument for Preserving the Agency Defense as Applied to Prosecutions for Unlawful Sale, Delivery, and Possession of Drugs by Parker, Scott W.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 6 Article 14 
1998 
An Argument for Preserving the Agency Defense as Applied to 
Prosecutions for Unlawful Sale, Delivery, and Possession of Drugs 
Scott W. Parker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott W. Parker, An Argument for Preserving the Agency Defense as Applied to Prosecutions for Unlawful 
Sale, Delivery, and Possession of Drugs, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2649 (1998). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/14 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
An Argument for Preserving the Agency Defense as Applied to Prosecutions for 
Unlawful Sale, Delivery, and Possession of Drugs 
Cover Page Footnote 
I would like to thank my parents, John and Debra, for their continued and unending support. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/14 
AN ARGUMENT FOR PRESERVING THE AGENCY
DEFENSE AS APPLIED TO PROSECUTIONS FOR




The United States has developed a comprehensive set of laws
designed to combat the use of illicit drugs, on both the state and fed-
eral level. While most of these legislative schemes prohibit both the
sale and possession of illegal drugs, the penalties for sale of drugs are
consistently harsher than for mere possession.'
In order to be subject to prosecution for the unlawful sale of illegal
drugs, a person need not actually "sell" a drug in the ordinary sense of
the word.2 In fact, a defendant can be charged vith an unlawful sale
of drugs even if he or she simply hands over a quantity of drugs to
another person, without receiving any payment in return? In these
situations, the defendant is often acting as an agent or middleman on
behalf of the ultimate purchaser of the drugs. Although these agents
have not actually sold anything, in many states they are prosecuted for
sale.4
* I would like to thank my parents, John and Debra, for their continued and
unending support.
1. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.03, 220.31 (McKinney 1989) (categorizing the
criminal possession of a controlled substance as a Class A misdemeanor, while catego-
rizing the criminal sale of a controlled substance as a Class D felony); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 4231 (Michie Supp. 1997) (imposing a penalty for the possession of cocaine of
imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine up to $2000, or both, compared to
a penalty for the sale of cocaine of imprisonment for not more than five years or a
fine up to $100,000, or both); see also 720 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 570100 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997) ("It is not the intent of the General Assembly to treat the unlawful user
or occasional petty distributor of controlled substances with the same severity as the
large-scale, unlawful purveyors and traffickers of controlled substances.").
The penalties for sale are much more severe because "sellers are choosing to harm
others and not merely electing to bear the risk of harm to themselves." Frank 0.
Bowman, III, Playing "21" with Narcotics Enforcement: A Response to Professor Car-
rington, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937, 979 (1995).
2. See Black's Law Dictionary 1337 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "sale" as a contract
between two parties "by which the [seller], in consideration of the payment or promise
ofpayment of a certain price in money, transfers to the [buyer] the title and the pos-
session of property" (emphasis added)).
3. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-102(33) (1997) (defining "sale" as "a barter,
an exchange, or a gift, or an offer therefor"); N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00 (McKinney
1989) (defining "sell" as "to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or
agree to do the same"); State v. Allen, 292 A.2d 167, 171 (Me. 1972) ("[O]ur Legisla-
ture has broadened [the definition of 'sale'] to include the transfer of any narcotic
drug from one person to another, for a price or without value recompense .... ).
4. See, e.g., State v. Kim, 785 P.2d 941, 941-42 (Haw. 1990) (defendant took
money from an undercover agent, went to another part of the room, returned to the
agent, and gave him a napkin containing cocaine); State v. Deering, 611 A.2d 972, 973
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It is even possible for an agent or middleman to be convicted of
unlawful sale in situations in which he or she did not handle the drugs
at all, if the government can prove that the agent aided and abetted
the commission of the sale to the ultimate purchaser.5 Courts have
upheld such convictions for individuals who simply introduced a buyer
to a seller,6 even if the defendant was not present at the actual ex-
change of drugs.7 Further, individuals can also be convicted of unlaw-
(Me. 1992) (after informant gave defendant $100, defendant telephoned a drug sup-
plier, left the apartment, returned to the apartment, and gave the informant 3/4 of a
gram of cocaine and $20 change); State v. Lapan, 609 A.2d 970, 970-71 (Vt. 1992)
(undercover officer gave defendant $1425 in cash and the defendant briefly got into
another car, returned to the officer, and gave him a brown paper bag containing
cocaine).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is pun-
ishable as a principal."); N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00 (McKinney 1998) ("When one per-
son engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally
liable for such conduct when ... he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or in-
tentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct."); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-
402(2) (1997) ("A person is criminally responsible for an offense . . . if ... [aicting
with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the
proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid
another person to commit the offense . . ... "); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9A.08.020(3)(a) (West 1988) ("A person is an accomplice of another person in the
commission of a crime if... he solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other
person to commit it; or aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or commit-
ting it. . . ."); Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) ("In order to
aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant 'in some sort
associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he
wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed."' (quoting United
States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.))).
6. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 642 So. 2d 924, 927-28 (Miss. 1994) (affirming the
defendant's conviction for unlawful sale of drugs when the defendant drove an under-
cover agent to the supplier's house, introduced the seller to the officer, and observed
the completion of the sale); People v. Armstrong, 553 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (App. Div.
1990) (finding that defendant had "accessorial liability" with the co-defendant for un-
lawful sale when the defendant brought the buyer to the seller and served as a look-
out and guard during the completion of the sale); State v. Poplin, 289 S.E.2d 124, 130
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting
the sale of cocaine when the defendant arranged a sale at his home but laid on the
couch while the transaction was completed, on the theory that the defendant was
"ready to render assistance and encouragement to [the buyer] in the sale of the
cocaine").
7. See, e.g., People v. Cattaneo, 266 Cal. Rptr. 710, 713-15 (Ct. App. 1990) (up-
holding the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting two sales of a controlled
substance when the defendant had merely introduced an undercover officer to a seller
of cocaine and was not present at the actual sales, on the grounds that the evidence
established the defendant's intent to facilitate the sales); Wallace v. State, 344 S.E.2d
770, 770-71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming the defendant's conviction for sale of co-
caine, based upon evidence that the defendant arranged the sale between a govern-
ment informant and the defendant's brother, with the brother delivering the cocaine
to the informant the following day); State v. Grilli, 230 N.W.2d 445, 449-50 (Minn.
1975) (holding that evidence indicating that the defendant telephoned a marijuana
supplier and arranged a sale to an undercover officer was sufficient to support his
conviction for unlawful sale).
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ful sale by "steering" drug buyers to the drug sellers.8
The prosecution of purchasing agents has been the subject of much
debate. Many have contended that a person who is merely acting
upon a request from another person to purchase drugs for him, with-
out receipt of any consideration, should not be prosecuted to the same
extent as a person who sells drugs purely for profit.' Others have ar-
gued that, given the scourge of drug abuse, any participation in the
drug trade should be severely penalized.1" Many jurisdictions began
to recognize a doctrine known as the "agency defense,"' I based on the
8. According to the expert testimony of New York City police officer Hector
Vega, the role of a "steerer" in a drug transaction may be defined as follows:
[A] steerer usually aids in the drug sale by standing a short distance away
from the carrier of the drugs, soliciting or screening potential buyers, and
guiding buyers to the carrier, who then completes the sale. A steerer may be
part owner of the drugs being sold, or may simply receive a share of the
proceeds after the sale.
United States v. Resto, 824 F.2d 210, 211 (2d Cir. 1987). In Resto, the Second Circuit
upheld the defendant's conviction for aiding in the sale of crack within 1000 feet of a
school, based upon evidence indicating that the defendant conversed with an under-
cover officer and directed the officer to a nearby alley, where the officer purchased
three vials of crack. See id.; see also Stevens v. State, 436 S.E.2d 82, 82-83 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1993) (affirming the defendant's conviction for sale of cocaine when the defend-
ant asked two undercover officers what they were looking for, flagged down another
car driven by the seller of the cocaine, and stood to the side as the seller sold the
cocaine to the officers); People v. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d 272,273 (App. Div. 1995)
(upholding the defendant's conviction for unlawful sale based on the fact that the
defendant led the buyers to the principals of a cocaine selling operation, even though
the defendant "never negotiated with the [buyer], or handled the cash, the contra-
band or any of the drug selling paraphernalia"); People v. Hinton, 577 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64
(App. Div. 1991) (finding the evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant was
acting "in concert to possess and sell narcotics" when the defendant allowed an un-
dercover officer into a building to purchase cocaine after the officer gave a code
phrase to the defendant).
9. See, eg., Hill v. State, 348 So. 2d 848, 855 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (holding that
one acting solely on behalf of a purchaser of a controlled substance cannot be found
guilty of unlawful sale); People v. McGhee, 677 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)
(same); State v. Schilling, 712 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Kan. 1986) (same); Roy v. State, 489
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Nev. 1971) (same); People v. Andujas, 588 N.E.2d 754, 757 (N.Y.
1992) (same); State v. Lapan, 609 A.2d 970, 970-71 (Vt. 1992) (same); Abraham
Abramovsky, The Agency Defense in New York Drug Prosecutions, N.Y. Li., Apr. 1,
1997, at 3 (suggesting that the New York Court of Appeals needs to more clearly
define the agency defense in order to better protect defendants from New York's
harsh drug laws).
10. See, e.g., State v. Baltier, 505 P.2d 556, 557 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc) (holding that
one who acts purely on behalf of the purchaser of drugs can still be convicted of
unlawful sale); People v. Reyes, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1992) (same); Gay v.
State, 471 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (same); State v. Allen, 292 A.2d 167, 170-
71 (Me. 1972) (same); State v. Stone, 316 A.2d 196, 197 (N.H. 1974) (same); Stephen
P. Foster, Note, A Procuring Agent May Not Be Convicted of Narcotics Sale, 22 Kan.
L. Rev. 272, 280 (1974) (expressing concern that the agency defense might result in
the government losing its leverage against agents to obtain evidence in prosecutions
against drug sellers).
11. Some jurisdictions use the terms "procuring agent defense" or "buyer's agent
defense" rather than "agency defense," although they all have an identical meaning.
This Note uses the term "agency defense."
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underlying assumption that someone who acts as an agent without
consideration is not as culpable as the actual seller.
The fundamental theory of the agency defense is that "an individual
who acts as an extension of the buyer should not be held any more
culpable than the buyer himself.' 1 2 In other words, one acting as an
extension of the buyer should only be assigned the same degree of
culpability as the buyer, not the seller. Courts began to protect
purchasing agents from prosecution for the unlawful sale of drugs on
both technical and culpability grounds.' 3 This protection has been the
subject of great controversy.
This Note conducts a thorough examination of the agency defense
and its applications. Part I of this Note offers a history of the agency
defense, how the defense works, and the justifications offered by
courts for both its creation and preservation. Part II discusses the
Federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970. In particular, part II ex-
plains how this federal statute resulted in the demise of the agency
defense in federal courts and in some state courts. Part II also offers
the courts' rationale for eliminating the defense. Finally, part II shows
how, despite passage of the Controlled Substances Act, at least one
state has preserved the defense. Part III of this Note argues for uni-
form adoption of the agency defense. By examining the entrapment
defense, part III demonstrates how the agency defense reflects the ap-
propriate level of criminal culpability for agents. Further, it presents
the sound legal reasoning for preservation of the defense.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE AGENCY DEFENSE
This part looks at the beginnings of the agency defense and its sub-
sequent developments, explaining in detail the exact applications of
the defense. Further, this part examines the arguments given in sup-
port and in opposition of the defense.
A. History of the Agency Defense: United States v. Sawyer
The agency defense was first recognized by the Third Circuit in
United States v. Sawyer.'4 In Sawyer, the defendant appealed his con-
viction for the unlawful sale of heroin. 5 During the trial, the defend-
ant had offered evidence that an undercover federal agent repeatedly
requested the defendant to purchase heroin for him.' 6 In the process,
the undercover agent went so far as to feign a violent seizure to gain
sympathy from the defendant. 17 "[M]oved by [the undercover
agent's] apparent suffering," the defendant eventually complied with
12. Abramovsky, supra note 9, at 3 (footnote omitted).
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954).
15. Id. at 169.




the agent's request.'" The defendant testified that he purchased the
heroin at a nearby hotel, brought it back and gave it to the agent.' 9
Based on this evidence, the defendant was convicted on the sale
charge.20 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge erred
by refusing to explain to the jury the "difference in fact and in law
between dealing with a purchaser as seller and acting for him as a
procuring agent."'2 1 In other words, the defendant suggested that a
not-for-profit agent of the buyer should not be treated in the same
manner as a for-profit seller.
The Third Circuit, finding this distinction quite meaningful, re-
versed the defendant's conviction. 22 The court held that, under these
circumstances, the district court should have instructed the jury that:
[I]f they believed that the federal agent asked the defendant to get
some heroin for him and thereupon the defendant undertook to act
in the prospective purchaser's behalf rather than his own, and in so
doing purchased the drug from a third person with whom he was
not associated in selling, and thereafter delivered it to the buyer, the
defendant would not be a seller and could not be convicted under
this indictment.23
The court added that the decision to fully acquit the defendant of all
criminal charges resulted from the government's failure to charge the
defendant -with illegal possession of narcotics;24 the court was not sug-
gesting that this defendant was not guilty of a drug crime at all, but
only that he was not guilty of selling drugs.' Thus, the court implied
that a conviction for possession may have been justified; the court
18. Id.
19. I.
20. Id at 169.
21. Id at 170.
22. Id, at 171.
23. Id. at 170 (emphasis added). The court went so far as to declare that although
the theory of agency might not be clear to a layperson, it is -obvious" to a law yer. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sawyer represents the first case in which the agency defense was recognized in
connection with a narcotics case. Courts had previously applied the theory of agency,
however, in cases involving the sale of alcohol to a third party. See, e.g., Chance v.
State, 210 S.W. 208, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919) (holding that "where the defensive
theory raised by the evidence is that the accused was not interested in the sale and not
acting as the agent of the seller, but acted solely for the accommodation of the pur-
chaser in obtaining the liquor for him," a jury is required to acquit the defendant if
the defendant proves this theory); see also Bonds v. State, 30 So. 427, 428 (Ala. 1901)
(finding that one who acts solely as an agent for the ultimate purchaser of liquor
cannot be convicted of sale); Anderson v. State, 13 So. 435, 436 (Fla. 1893) (same);
City of Iola v. Lederer, 120 P. 354, 356 (Kan. 1912) (same); State v. Kilbreth, 159 A.
504, 504 (Me. 1932) (same). These courts all observed the rule that "one who
[purchases liquor] at [the purchaser's] solicitation, and as his hired agent, and with his
money, and for his use... did not commit the offense of selling." State v. Wallenberg,
197 N.W. 276, 277 (Minn. 1924). Under these cases, however, an agent could be con-
victed of such a crime if he had an interest in the sale. See Galbreath v. State, 216
S.W.2d 689, 690-91 (Tenn. 1948).
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noted, however, that the defendant was charged only with sale and not
possession, thus making a possession- conviction impossible.
B. How the Agency Defense Works
As an illustration of how the agency defense actually works, con-
sider the following hypothetical. The defense typically arises as fol-
lows: X-who is usually either a government informant or a police
officer 26-asks Y to obtain some illegal drugs for X, 7 giving Y just
enough money to cover the purchase price of the drugs. Y, acting
solely upon X's request, purchases the drugs from Z, and then gives
the drugs to X, without receiving any extra compensation in return. 8
According to most state statutes, however, Y has technically commit-
ted a sale of drugs when he hands the drugs to X, even though he may
not have received any compensation for his actions.2 9 Y can also be
charged with possession of drugs, even though he may have possessed
them only for an instant.30
26. This individual is not required to be associated with the government in order
for a defendant to be able to use the agency defense, although in the overwhelming
majority of cases, the government is somehow involved. See, e.g., Love v. State, 893
P.2d 376, 380 (Nev. 1995) ("[Wle have never expressly nor impliedly indicated that
the [agency] defense is limited to situations where the buyer is acting as an agent of
the State."); People v. Tower, 505 N.Y.S.2d 275,276 (App. Div. 1986) (approving a set
of jury instructions which discussed "the accommodation of a friend as a basis for a
finding of agency").
27. Because the government is very frequently involved in cases such as these,
defendants usually assert the defense of entrapment and the agency defense simulta-
neously. See United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570, 572 (1st Cir. 1970) ("[lIt may be
observed that assertion of the procuring agent theory as a defense frequently goes
hand in hand with a claim of entrapment."). For a discussion of the entrapment de-
fense, see infra Part III.A.1.
28. It is possible, however, for a defendant to invoke the agency defense even if he
or she receives a nominal benefit from the transaction. See infra note 37 and accompa-
nying text.
29. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. Because the agency defense can
be raised when a defendant actually transfers the drugs to the ultimate purchaser
during the course of a sale, the defense also clearly applies to situations in which the
defendant did not handle the drugs at all, but merely participated in some manner in
the sale. See, e.g., People v. King, 541 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (App. Div. 1989) (finding re-
versible error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the agency defense
when the defendant instructed an undercover officer how to complete a drug transac-
tion with a third party); People v. Cierzniewski, 529 N.Y.S.2d 886, 886-87 (App. Div.
1988) (holding that the failure of the trial court to charge the jury with the agency
defense constituted reversible error when the defendant did not handle any drugs, but
simply introduced an undercover officer to two men who sold the officer cocaine). At
least one state court found this distinction meaningful under a statute prohibiting the
unlawful "delivery" of a controlled substance. See State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa
1977). For a discussion of Lott, see infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Mass. 1969) ("Pos-
session ought not to depend on the duration of time elapsing after one has an object
under his control."); People v. Sierra, 379 N.E.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1978) ("Crimes of
possession of a controlled substance include but make no allowance or exception for
fleeting or momentary contact.").
[Vol. 66265,4.
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The distinction drawn by Sawyer between agency and sale was vali-
dated by other courts. As Sawyer also correctly implied, the protec-
tion offered by the agency defense does not extend to a charge of
unlawful possession.31 This is because the theory of the agency de-
fense is that the agent should have the same degree of culpability as
the ultimate purchaser of the drugs.32 Because the ultimate purchaser
can be convicted of unlawful possession, the agent should also be sub-
ject to a possession conviction. In other words, "even though an agent
can be held no more culpable than the buyer, he is also no less
culpable."33
There are other intricacies to the defense as well, all based on the
common ideal that punishment should bear some relationship to
moral culpability and legal responsibility. For example, if the defend-
ant is charged wvith unlawful possession with intent to sell when acting
on behalf of a purchaser, he or she can invoke the agency defense.'
This merely extends the logic of Sawyer, because "[i]f a person acting
31. See United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169, 170 (3d Cir. 1954) ("The govern-
ment having elected to charge the defendant with the crime of sale rather than illegal
possession, the jury should have been alerted to the legal limitations of the sale con-
cept ... ." (emphasis added)); see also Buckley v. State, 600 P.2d 227, 228 (Nev. 1979)
(refusing to allow the defendant to use the agency defense for a charge of criminal
possession of a controlled substance); Sierra, 379 N.E.2d at 197 (same); State v.
Carter, 636 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tenn. 1982) (same). In Sierra, the New York Court of
Appeals observed that "the theory [of the agency defense] does not fit within the
ambit of mere possession ... since [it] contains no element pertaining to or any excep-
tion in respect to an agent or person possessing on behalf of another." Sierra, 379
N.E.2d at 199.
Additionally, the defense may not be applicable if the defendant already had pos-
session of the drugs before the ultimate purchaser made a request for drugs to the
defendant. See Love, 893 P.2d at 380.
32. See supra notes 9 & 12 and accompanying text.
33. Abramovsky, supra note 9, at 3. Even in states which do not allow the use of
the agency defense, an agent or middleman who is convicted of unlawful sale of drugs
cannot be simultaneously convicted of possession of those drugs. For example, in
Maine, a defendant is not permitted to use the agency defense. See State v. Deering,
611 A.2d 972, 974 (Me. 1992). The Maine Supreme Court, however, recognized that:
Where the only possession of the narcotic drug is that incident to and neces-
sary for the sale thereof, and it does not appear that there was possession
before or after and apart from such sale, the State cannot fragment the ac-
cused's involvement into separate and distinct acts or transactions to obtain
multiple convictions, and separate convictions under such circumstances will
not stand.
State v. Allen, 292 A.2d 167, 172 (Me. 1972); see also Moon v. State, 222 S.E.2d 635,
637 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) ("[T]he court must beware of a double conviction and pun-
ishment where possession is merged in the sale."); People v. Abdul-Aziz, 628
N.Y.S.2d 272, 273-74 (App. Div. 1995) (upholding the defendant's conviction in an
agency case for unlawful sale of a controlled substance, but reversing his conviction
for unlawful possession of a controlled substance). In Abdul-Aziz, the court reasoned
that although the evidence of the defendant's "transitory and fleeting contemporane-
ous presence in the apartment" was sufficient to prove his participation in the sale,
the defendant did not exercise "dominion and control" over the cocaine that was
eventually sold to an undercover officer. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74.
34. See Hillis v. State, 746 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Nev. 1987); Sierra, 379 N.E.2d at 197.
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solely as an agent of the buyer is not a seller, neither does he possess
the controlled substance for the purpose of selling it." 35
After acting as an agent for another person in a drug transaction,
the agent cannot invoke the agency defense if he or she received a
significant benefit from the transaction.36 Generally speaking, though,
if the agent only receives a slight benefit as a result of the transaction,
it does not negate the possibility of using the agency defense.37 This is
because the mere request for a tip from a buyer does not "necessarily
or even ordinarily alter the relationship between the parties, the na-
ture of the transaction or the defendant's culpability. ' 38 Along the
same lines, if the defendant, while making a purchase of drugs for
another, keeps some of the drugs from the transaction for personal
use, he or she is not necessarily prevented from using the agency de-
fense for the portion of the drugs that he gives to another.39
Further, it is important to note that the determination of whether a
defendant is considered to be an agent of the buyer is generally a
question for the jury, not the judge.4" Therefore, as long as there is
"some reasonable view of the evidence" that a defendant acted purely
on behalf of a buyer of drugs, a judge is required to submit the agency
defense to the jury in those jurisdictions accepting the defense.4'
35. Hillis, 746 P.2d at 1095.
36. See, e.g., People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 212 (N.Y. 1978) ("[The agent's]
function must be performed without any profit motive." (citation omitted)).
37. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 348 So. 2d 848, 856 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (finding that
the defendant's request for compensation and his acceptance of five dollars from an
undercover officer, after the defendant had acted as a procuring agent for the under-
cover officer's marijuana purchase, did not preclude the defendant's ability to use the
agency defense as a defense to the charge of unlawful sale); Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 213
("That an agent does not act gratuitously would not necessarily be inconsistent with
the defense of agency." (citations omitted)).
38. People v. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200, 207 (N.Y. 1978).
39. For example, in People v. Andujas, 588 N.E.2d 754, 756 (N.Y. 1992), the de-
fendant appealed his conviction for the unlawful sale of a controlled substance. The
defendant testified that he purchased some cocaine for an undercover officer and
shared it with the officer. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the jury instruc-
tions were erroneous because they "unfairly suggested that the agency defense is not
available when, as was assertedly the case, defendant purchased part of the drugs for
his own use and part for another person." Id. The New York Court of Appeals re-
versed the defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial. Id. at 757-58. The court
agreed that the instructions were erroneous, because they potentially gave the impres-
sion to jurors that "because [the defendant] had an interest in obtaining [a portion of
the] drugs for his own use,... somehow he could therefore not be an agent" for the
portion of the drugs which the defendant gave to the officer. Id. at 756.
40. See, e.g., People v. McGhee, 677 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (finding
that "the jury, as the sole judge of credibility, must determine the validity of the
[agency] defense" (citation omitted)); Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206 ("The de-
termination as to whether the defendant was [an agent of the buyer] is generally a
factual question for the jury to resolve on the circumstances of the particular case.").
41. People v. King, 541 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (App. Div. 1989); see also State v. Osburn,
505 P.2d 742, 747 (Kan. 1973) (holding that if the agency defense is properly raised, a
jury should be instructed on its application).
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Nonetheless, the fact that the defendant behaved as a middleman, in
and of itself, does not compel the use of the defense. 2 In other words,
"[a]ll agents are, concededly, middlemen of sorts. But the converse is
not true."43 If there is, in fact, no reasonable view that a defendant
acted purely on behalf of the purchaser of the drugs, the judge need
not instruct the jury on the agency defense.'
C. Justifications and Criticisms of the Agency Defense
The agency defense received a warm reception in both federal and
state courts after the Sawyer decision.45 The creation and develop-
ment of the defense stemmed from a judicial desire to ensure fairness
to defendants who "appear to be on the extreme fringe of drug traf-
ficking activities,"'  a fairness which might be compromised by min-
dless application of statutes proscribing the unlawful sale of drugs.
Courts recognizing the defense understood that it makes little sense to
assign the same degree of culpability to an individual who is merely an
extension of a purchaser of drugs as to a dealer who sells solely for a
profit.
47
42. See, e.g., People v. Smith, No. 78,789, 1998 WL 81253, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div.
Feb. 26, 1998) (holding that the defendant's "actions in this drug transaction, though
intermediary in nature, did not warrant an agency charge" (citation omitted)); People
v. South, 649 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (App. Div. 1996) ("Evidence that defendant may have
been acting as a middleman in the drug transaction is insufficient to warrant a charge
on the agency defense." (citation omitted)).
43. People v. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d 191, 194 (N.Y. 1978). The New York Court of
Appeals further explained:
A middleman who acts as a broker between a seller and buyer, aiming to
satisfy both, but largely for his own benefit, cannot properly be termed an
agent of either. Such a middleman is a trader in narcotics, a merchant. He
may not be concerned with the particular needs of an individual drug pur-
chaser except to the extent that satisfying those needs affects his illicit busi-
ness. To call him an agent strains beyond recognition the agency concept.
Id.
44. See, e.g., People v. Herring, 632 N.E.2d 1272, 1273 (N.Y. 1994) ("Before an
agency charge is warranted, the evidence must be indicative of a relationship with the
buyer [and] not merely raise ambiguities about the defendant's connection to the
seller.").
45. See Garcia v. United States, 373 F.2d 806, 809-10 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Winfield, 341 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1965); Lewis v. United States, 337 F.2d 541,
543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Vasquez v. United States, 290 F.2d 897, 898-99 (9th Cir.
1961); Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1959); Commonwealth
v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346,349 (Mass. 1969); People v. Branch, 213 N.Y.S.2d 535,535
(App. Div. 1961); Durham v. State, 280 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955).
46. Elaine Marie Tomko, Annotation, Criminality of Act of Directing To, or Rec-
ommending, Source From Which Illicit Drugs May Be Purchased. 34 A.LR. 5th 125,
125 (1995).
47. See, e.g., People v. Andujas, 588 N.E.2d 754, 757 (N.Y. 1992) ("The [agency]
defense simply reflects the logical proposition that if a defendant is acting solely in a
capacity which is inherently inconsistent with being a seller-i.e., acting as an agent
for the buyer-he cannot be a seller.").
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The New York Court of Appeals has eloquently provided the fol-
lowing explanation for its adherence to the agency defense:
It is ... not to be assumed that all those who engage in procurement
of illegal drugs are motivated by a criminal disposition rather than a
desire to satisfy a personal craving to feed an irresistible habit or to
aid one so afflicted. Thus, the "agency defense" in good part may
be seen as a common-law attempt, in appropriate cases, to recog-
nize the existence of medical and sociological aspects which compli-
cate the factual setting within which the nature of a particular
defendant's participation is to be determined.48
The Court of Appeals wisely determined that a deeper analysis of the
agent's role in a drug transaction was required in order to determine
the agent's proper culpability. The agency defense gives the criminal
justice system the necessary leeway to mete out justice appropriately
when dealing with the myriad of drug cases.49
These courts may have also considered it highly improbable that
state legislatures would take an initiative to officially incorporate the
agency defense into their drug statutes. Such an action would proba-
bly be unpopular with voters, who would likely perceive it as being
too lenient on criminals.5" Indeed, as one commentator observed,
"What legislator wants to appear soft on crime by decreasing penalties
for offenses involving violence or drugs?"'"
In addition to the culpability considerations which justify the agency
defense, there are also sound legal reasons for the defense. For in-
stance, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that it
had "no authority by statute" to find that a defendant "is subject to
criminal responsibility for the crime of 'selling,' if his conduct, accord-
ing to the undisputed evidence, does not afford a reasonable inference
that he participated with the seller in making the sale.""2 Such an
observation suggests that, if an agent in no way acted on behalf of the
seller, the agent has not committed the crime of unlawful sale.53
48. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 211 (N.Y. 1978).
49. For a discussion of what constitutes "justice" for purchasing agents, see infra
notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
50. See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit. The Drug War's Hid-
den Economic Agenda, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 39 (1998) (observing the "public demise
of people deemed 'soft on drugs"'); Jason A. Gillmer, Note, United States v. Clary:
Equal Protection and the Crack Statute, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 497, 564-65 (1995) ("With
their constituents demanding action, any legislator failing to respond [to the drug is-
sue] risked being labeled 'soft on crime' and faced almost certain defeat in the next
election."); Laura A. Wytsma, Comment, Punishment for "Just Us"-A Constitutional
Analysis of the Crack Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 473,
511 (1995) ("Politicians simply will not reduce disproportionate drug penalties and
bear the legitimate risk of being savaged as 'soft on crime.').
51. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effective-
ness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 61, 123 (1993).
52. Hill v. State, 348 So. 2d 848, 855 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977).
53. See 35 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 3508 (1995) (observing that "when a de-
fendant asserts the defense of agency, he denies that he made the sale").
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The Vermont Supreme Court, in State v. Bressette," offered an-
other justification for the continued existence of the agency defense as
applied to a charge of unlawful sale of drugs. The defendant, appeal-
ing a conviction for the sale of marijuana, argued that the lower court
erred in refusing to offer to charge the jury in accordance with the
agency defense;55 he would not be a "seller" under the statute if the
evidence showed that he acted solely on behalf of the purchaser of the
marijuana.56 The court reversed the defendant's conviction on the
grounds that the lower court erred by refusing to submit the agency
defense to the jury.57 Explaining the rationale for its decision, the
court stated:
The defined crime here is one of selling, not merely of participating
in a sale. The distinction is important, and it does not turn... upon
the fact that defendant admittedly participated, in some capacity, in
the making of a sale. Every buyer is, in a sense, a participant in a
sale; the very term imports two parties to the transaction. But it
begs the point here in issue to say that both become sellers, or that
the purpose of the statute requires such strained construction....
[I]t does not follow, as the State would argue, that all parties to the
transaction thereby become sellers. 58
The court added that "[p]lainly put, we view the defendant's position
as technically correct."5 9 Focusing on the wording of the statute, the
court found that the statute's purpose was to assign criminal liability
only to sellers of drugs, rather than to buyers or their agents.' Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that an agent of the buyer who in no way
associated with the seller does not commit the crime of unlawful
sale.6'
Despite the formidable culpability and legal justifications for the
agency defense, critics have taken issue with the defense, both in its
theory and its application.62 Most frequently, opponents of the agency
defense often refer to the severity of the drug problem in the United
States as a justification for refusing to allow the defense.63 More spe-
cifically, critics claim that the legislature, when attempting to combat
54. 388 A.2d 395 (Vt. 1978).
55. Id. at 396.
56. Id
57. Id. at 398.
58. Id. at 397.
59. Id. at 398.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. One critic vehemently denounced the agency defense as an -unwarranted, un-
necessary, and essentially unworkable judicial modification" of criminal law. People v.
Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 214 (N.Y. 1978) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part).
63. See State v. Allen, 292 A.2d 167, 171 (Me. 1972) (rejecting the agency defense,
on the grounds that "[ilt is clear that the legislative design in Maine is to eradicate the
unauthorized traffic in narcotics"); State v. Reed, 170 A.2d 419,425 (NJ. 1961) ("The
[drug] statute was passed as an all-out offensive to combat the drug evil ... ."); see
also infra note 72 (noting Congressional reaction to the drug problem).
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the drug problem in the most effective possible manner, could not
have intended for agents to be free from liability for unlawful sale.64
As the Supreme Court of Illinois observed, "[w]e are of the opinion
that the definition [of sale] shows a legislative intent that the act of a
person whether as agent, either for the seller or the purchaser, or as a
go-between, in such a transaction constitutes a sale. 65
Along the same lines, some have reasoned that because the
purchasing agent makes it easier for others to obtain drugs, he or she
should not enjoy the mitigated culpability of mere possession.66 In
other words, "[tlhe agent who delivers to his principal performs a ser-
vice in increasing the distribution of narcotics. Without the agent's
services the principal might never come into possession of the drug."'67
According to this argument, the drug laws were designed to punish all
"links" in the drug trafficking chain with equal severity.68
Further, a practical concern about applying the agency defense is
the detrimental effect that it might have on the government's ability to
present evidence at trial. As one commentator observed:
As a result [of the agency defense],.., prosecutors may have lost a
substantial lever in obtaining incriminating evidence for use in pros-
ecution against drug sellers. Conviction of a drug seller may depend
entirely on a procuring agent's testimony. An agent's incentive to
testify against a seller in exchange for a plea bargain may be dimin-
ished because he can now be charged with only possession. If the
procuring agent does not wish to bargain for dismissal of the posses-
sion charge, the seller may have to be approached directly by under-
cover agents. This direct approach may be the only method to
64. See McKay v. State, 489 P.2d 145, 152 (Alaska 1971) ("We believe the courts
that have rejected [the agency defense] have more accurately reflected the probable
legislative intent underlying the rather expansive definition of 'sale' contained in
[their drug laws]."); State v. Jacobson, 490 P.2d 433. 435 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (finding
that "the act of a person, whether as agent for the seller or purchaser, or as a go-
between in a narcotics transaction constitutes a sale," because "the legislative defini-
tion of the word 'sale' [in the context of drugs] is broader in scope than the definition
usually given to it in other branches of the law"); Allen, 292 A.2d at 171 ("The Legis-
lature ... intended the [drug sale law] to have the broadest scope to facilitate its
enforcement.").
65. People v. Shannon, 155 N.E.2d 578, 580 (I11. 1959).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 593 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Congress
intended to prevent individuals from acquiring drugs for whatever purpose on behalf
of others and then transferring the drugs to those others."); Bowman, supra note 1, at
979 ("[T]o the extent that the criminal law imposes heavy punishment for a defend-
ant's culpability in causing direct harms to drug users, it does so because sellers are
choosing to harm others and not merely electing to bear the risk of harm to
themselves.").
67. United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1977).
68. See People v. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200, 205 (N.Y. 1978) (suggesting
that those who oppose the agency defense posit that the legislature "intended [an
agent of the buyer] to be considered a seller because intermediaries, like sellers, are
an essential link in the illicit drug traffic the statute was designed to eliminate").
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obtain sufficient evidence upon which to convict sellers who are in-
sulated from buyers.
69
Similarly, as a dissenting judge in a New York agency defense case
stated, "[looking to the realities of the rather murky world of the
drug culture and of drug dealers, it is clear that [proof of the absence
of agency] will often be well nigh impossible to obtain."7 The judge
further lamented that "it would appear that the use of a few fairly
simple ruses by a dealer would suffice to throw an impenetrable veil of
confusion and uncertainty over his dealings and his status. 71
Irrespective of either the merits or the drawbacks of the agency de-
fense, the increasing drug trade caused Congress to act. Its response,
the Controlled Substance Act, imposed severe penalties on all partici-
pants in the drug trade. The statute, which was emulated by many
states in their own laws, also marked the decline of the agency de-
fense, which will be explored fully in part II.
II. THE FALL OF THE AGENCY DEFENSE
This part of the Note explains the 1970 Congressional Act which
adversely affected the agency defense. It also documents the interpre-
tation of the Act by federal and state courts. Further, this part ex-
plains how, despite the passage of the Act, some state courts still
managed to preserve the defense.
A. The Controlled Substance Act and its Effect in Federal Courts
In 1970, Congress dramatically challenged the viability of the
agency defense.72 The "Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act"' 3
69. Foster, supra note 10, at 280. An agent's diminished incentive to testify likely
stems from the fact that the penalties for sale are much more severe than those for
mere possession. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Because the agency de-
fense prevents the defendant from being convicted for anything more than possession,
he or she might not want to take the risk of testifying against the seller in exchange
for a lesser sentence, for fear of retaliation. See Mireya Navarro, Puerto Rico Accepts
Plan For Witnesses, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1997, at A17 (reporting on the relocation to
the United States of low to mid-level drug dealers who testified against leaders of
drug organizations at trials).
70. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 218 (N.Y. 1978) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in
part). Proof of an absence of agency can be shown by, among other things, the de-
fendant's exhibition of "salesman-like" behavior. See infra note 275.
71. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 218 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part); see United States v.
Simons, 374 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 1966) ("It makes no difference ... whether the
middleman... is acting for... the buyer or the seller.... If, in order to convict a
middleman, it is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his association with
the seller, it seems to us that the efficacy of the [sale statute] is nullified.").
72. Congress made the following finding and declaration: -[We have] long recog-
nized the danger involved in the manufacture, distribution, and use of certain psycho-
tropic substances for nonscientific and nonmedical purposes, and [we have] provided
strong and effective legislation to control illicit trafficking .... 21 U.S.C. § 801a(1)
(1994).
73. Id. §§ 801-971.
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spelled the beginning of the end of the agency defense in federal
courts. After it was enacted by Congress, Title II of this Act, known
as the "Controlled Substances Act, 7 4 was approved in 1970 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("Commissioners").75 After approval by the Commissioners, the
Controlled Substances Act was adopted by nearly every state.76 The
significance of its widespread adoption with respect to the agency de-
fense was dramatic; in expanding the scope of the law to define those
who are in almost any way whatsoever involved in a drug transaction
as sellers, the Controlled Substances Act effectively eliminated the
agency defense. Specifically, the Controlled Substances Act stated
that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."77 The crux of
the problem for the agency defense lay in the Controlled Substances
Act's definition of "distribute," which is defined as "deliver[ing] ... a
controlled substance or a listed chemical."78 Further, "deliver" is de-
fined as "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled
substance or a listed chemical, whether or not there exists an agency
relationship.'79 Thus, under the precise terms of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act, one who bought drugs on behalf of another and handed
the drugs to that person, without receipt of any consideration for his
or her efforts, is guilty of "delivery."8 As a result, the agency defense
is effectively eliminated under the Controlled Substances Act.
Due to the Controlled Substances Act's definition of "distribution,"
the federal courts applying the Act felt that they were no longer able
to allow defendants to utilize the agency defense.8 For example, in
74. Id. § 841.
75. Unif. Controlled Substances Act (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 5, Pt. 11 (1997).
76. In fact, 48 out of 50 states adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of
1970 ("Uniform Act"), which was modeled on the Federal Controlled Substances Act.
Unif. Controlled Substances Act (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 645-50, Pt. IV (1997).
New Hampshire and Vermont did not substantially adopt the Uniform Act; their drug
laws, however, contain "some similar provisions and [have] the same general purpose
[as the Uniform Act]." Id. at 648, 650.
77. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994).
78. Id. § 802(11).
79. Id. § 802(8) (emphasis added).
80. Further, because the Controlled Substances Act prohibits constructive trans-
fers in addition to actual transfers, see supra text accompanying note 79, a defendant
need not actually handle the controlled substance in order to be convicted of unlawful
delivery, either as an accomplice or as a principal. See infra notes 98-102 and accom-
panying text. This is because the Controlled Substances Act "defines the crime [of
delivery] broadly enough to include acts which other statutes may have defined
merely as aiding and abetting." United States v. Wigley, 627 F.2d 224, 226 (10th Cir.
1980).
81. In fact, every circuit which has considered the status of the agency defense
after the implementation of the Controlled Substances Act has ruled that it is no
longer applicable. See United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1985);
Wigley. 627 F.2d at 226; United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d 1166, 1169 (4th Cir. 1976);
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United States v. Pruitt,82 the defendant appealed his conviction for her-
oin distribution in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.' The
evidence showed that the defendant handed over heroin to a govern-
ment informant on two separate occasions.' The defendant alleged
that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on his "procuring
agent" defense was reversible error.'5
Even assuming arguendo that the defendant fit the description of a
"procuring agent,"86 the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's argu-
ment and affirmed his conviction. 7 The court observed that the de-
fendant, by his own admission, handed over heroin to a government
informant; this clearly satisfied the elements of the crime of "distribu-
tion,"88 which punished virtually all participation in a drug transac-
tion.8 9 The conclusion of the court was that the Controlled Substances
Act eliminated the agency defense in a prosecution for unlawful "de-
livery,"9 0 making the defendant's status as an agent irrelevant to the
Controlled Substances Act.91 Further, in reaching its decision, the
court claimed to be adhering to the legislative intent underlying the
Controlled Substances Act.9"
United States v. Oquendo, 505 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Pierce, 498 F.2d 712, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Redwood,
492 F.2d 216, 216 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 220-21 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1973).
82. 487 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1973).
83. Id at 1242.
84. Id- at 1243.
85. Id. at 1242.
86. Id. at 1243.
87. Id. at 1246.
88. Id at 1245.
89. Id
90. Id. at 1243.
91. Id at 1245.
92. The Eighth Circuit explained:
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 is ex-
tremely broad in scope, no longer restricted to the narrower concepts of buy
and sell, but all inclusive in covering the entire field of narcotics and danger-
ous drugs in all phases of their manufacturing, processing, distribution and
use. All distribution is controlled or prohibited, legitimate or illegitimate....
Congress undoubtedly intended by this new Act to make an all-out attempt
to combat illicit drugs by subjecting any individual who knowingly partici-
pates in the distribution to substantial, and in some cases severe, penalties
while dealing less severely with, and attempting to aid, the unfortunate indi-




B. State Adoption and Treatment of the Controlled Substances Act
1. Breakdown of States Eliminating the Agency Defense Under
the Controlled Substances Act
Following the federal lead, almost every state legislature adopted
the Controlled Substances Act into its own statutory regime.93 Due to
the wording of the Act,94 many state courts that had previously al-
lowed defendants to utilize the agency defense interpreted the statute
in the same manner as their federal counterparts, and began disallow-
ing use of the defense.95 Consequently, in these states, a defendant
who merely acted as an extension of a purchaser of drugs and in no
way associated himself with the seller, could no longer be protected
from prosecution for unlawful "delivery" or "distribution" of drugs.
The result of the Controlled Substances Act on state law was similar
to its effect on federal law: the state laws greatly expanded the reach
of the criminal justice system to penalize virtually all participants in a
drug transaction.96
93. See supra note 76. While almost every state has adopted the Controlled Sub-
stances Act in one form or another, however, not all states adopted the criminaliza-
tion of "delivery." In the General Statutory Note to the Uniform Act of 1994, it is
noted that while each state law modeled after the Uniform Act "is a substantial adop-
tion of the major provisions of the Uniform Act, it departs from the official text in
such manner that the various instances of substitution, omission, and additional mat-
ter cannot be clearly indicated by statutory notes." Unif. Controlled Substances Act
(amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 8-14, Pt. 11 (1997). But in those states that did adopt the
criminalization of "delivery" of a controlled substance, the definition of "delivery" is
usually identical to the federal version. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.71.900(6) (Michie
1996) (defining "delivery" as "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one
person to another of a controlled substance whether or not there is an agency rela-
tionship"); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-240(11) (West 1994) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-401(12) (Supp. 1997) (same); see also 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 600/2(c) (West
1993) (defining "delivery" as "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of pos-
session, with or without consideration, whether or not there is an agency relation-
ship"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:961(10) (West Supp. 1998) (defining "delivery" as
"the transfer of a controlled dangerous substance whether or not there exists an
agency relationship").
94. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
95. See State v. Burden, 948 P.2d 991, 993-94 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (finding that
the defendant's status as an agent for the purchaser is irrelevant to a statutory scheme
like the one at issue, where the proscribed activity is "delivery" rather than "sale");
Webber v. State, 692 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (same); State v. Theriault,
663 A.2d 423, 430 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (same); People v. Williams, 221 N.W.2d 204
(Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (same); State v. Sherman, 547 P.2d 1234 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)
(same): see also State v. Kelsey, 566 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Haw. 1977) (holding that a
statute proscribing the "distribution" of drugs eliminated a defendant's ability to in-
voke the agency defense); Tipton v. State, 528 P.2d 1115, 1116-17 (Okla. Crim. App.
1974) (same); State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah 1977) (same). Compare
Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1969) (allowing the use of the
agency defense), with Commonwealth v. Noons, 308 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. App. Ct.
1974) (holding that the defendant cannot invoke the agency defense, because the new
statute prohibited the delivery rather than the sale of drugs).
96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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2. The Workings of the Controlled Substances Act and Similar
State Statutes
An agent or middleman is susceptible to prosecution for the sale of
drugs even in situations where he or she did not actually handle the
drugs. 97 Similarly, a defendant can also be convicted of "delivery" or
"distribution" without touching the drugs at all, if the government
proves that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of the
delivery.98 A defendant can aid and abet the delivery of a controlled
substance by bringing the buyer to the seller,9 pointing out the seller
to the buyer, 00 or serving as a translator between the buyer and the
seller.' 0' The government, however, need not charge the defendant
with aiding and abetting the delivery; it can simply charge the defend-
ant as a principal to the delivery itself.1'0 2
97. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion on the offense of aiding and abetting the commission of a drug
sale, see supra note 5.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66,70 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the
evidence proved that the defendant aided and abetted the delivery of heroin when the
defendant brought an undercover officer together with the seller and remained in
their presence during the transaction); State v. Sharp, 662 P.2d 1135, 1136, 1139
(Idaho 1983) (affirming the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting the deliv-
ery of a controlled substance when the defendant directed two buyers to a certain
house, entered the house, returned from the house accompanied by a friend, and
stood by while the friend sold the two buyers a quantity of PCP); Lacy v. State, 782
S.W.2d 556,557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (affirming the defendant's conviction of deliv-
ery of crack cocaine when the defendant led the officers to an apartment complex to
complete the drug transaction but "did not physically deliver the drugs to the agents
nor did he physically receive any money from the officers for his services").
100. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 466 N.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (af-
firming the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting the commission of delivery
of a controlled substance when the defendant pointed out the supplier to the buyers
and informed the buyers how they could get his supplier to stop the car).
101. See, e.g., People v. Aguirre, 610 N.E.2d 771, 775 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (-One
who acts as an interpreter or translator during a drug transaction is certainly facilitat-
ing the commission of the crime."); State v. Bargas-Perez, 844 P.2d 931, 932-33 (Or.
Ct. App. 1992) (finding the defendant liable as an accomplice for the deliver' of co-
caine when the defendant served as a translator to the seller and directed the buyer to
the seller for the purchase, because "the least degree of concert or collusion between
the parties to an illegal transaction makes the act of one of them the act of them all").
102. The Tenth Circuit observed that:
[The Controlled Substances Act] defines the crime [of delivery] broadly
enough to include acts which other statutes may have defined merely as aid-
ing and abetting. Activities in furtherance of the ultimate sale-such as
vouching for the quality of the drugs, negotiating for or receiving the price,
and supplying or delivering the drug-are sufficient to establish distribution.
United States v. Wigley, 627 F.2d 224, 226 (10th Cir. 1980); see also United States v.
Oquendo, 505 F.2d 1307, 1310 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he fortuitous circumstance
that [the defendant] did not physically touch the drugs involved in the... transaction
does not take him from within this statute's coverage [as a principal]."); United States
v. Bailey, 505 F.2d 417, 419-21 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that the defendants, who
served as intermediaries in a sale of heroin to two buyers, could "come under the
rubric either of distributing heroin or aiding and abetting in its distribution" (empha-
sis added)); State v. Guyott, 239 N.W.2d 781,782 (Neb. 1976) (holding that the statute
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While penalizing a wide range of conduct, statutes which prohibit
"delivery" or "distribution" have not been extended to include the
purchase or possession of drugs. °3 This is because "[t]he purchaser of
controlled substances commits the crime of 'possession' and not 'de-
livery,' and, thus, is not an accomplice to a defendant charged with
unlawful distribution."'0 4 It is possible, however, to be convicted of
delivery of a controlled substance even when the defendant merely
possesses drugs, if the charge is criminal possession with the intent to
deliver (and such intent is proven).'0 5
Controversy exists as to whether, under the Controlled Substances
Act, a person who purchases drugs to share with somebody else has
"delivered" or "distributed" the drugs to this person. In an instance
where two people simultaneously purchase a drug for their own per-
sonal use, courts have generally held that this does not constitute a
"delivery."' 1 6 This situation, however, has been distinguished from
prohibiting delivery of a controlled substance includes "constructive and indirect"
transfer as well as "actual, direct physical transfers").
103. See, e.g., United States v. Harold, 531 F.2d 704, 705 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[T]o
participate actively in the distribution of heroin to others one must do more than
receive it as a user."); see also State v. Celestine, 671 So. 2d 896, 897 (La. 1996) (hold-
ing that the statute proscribing the "delivery" of drugs cannot be used against the
ultimate recipient of those drugs); Robinson v. State, 815 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (same); State v. Morris, 896 P.2d 81, 82-83 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (same).
One court declared that "[in our view, it would take Procrustes himself to fit 'to buy'
or 'to offer to buy' into the statutory definition of 'to distribute."' State v. Aluli, 893
P.2d 168, 171 (Haw. 1995).
104. Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 602 (Wyo. 1984). This conclusion is consistent
with the way in which courts have handled drug buyers in the context of statutes
prohibiting the sale of drugs. See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. Courts
have uniformly held that the ultimate purchaser cannot be convicted of sale on the
theory that he or she aided and abetted the seller in the consummation of the sale. Id.
105. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally to ... possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance."). In other words, if the government can prove that the agent
purchased the drugs with the intention of delivering the drug to another person, the
defendant is not shielded from prosecution for unlawful delivery. This is because the
agent is not intended to be the ultimate recipient of the drugs.
106. One of the leading cases on this issue is United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d
445 (2d Cir. 1977). In Swiderski, the defendant appealed his conviction of possession
with intent to distribute. Id. at 447. According to the evidence, the defendant went to
a studio apartment, accompanied by his fiancee, and purchased some cocaine. Id. at
448. He and his fiancee then proceeded to sample the cocaine. Id. The Second Cir-
cuit reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for an entry of a judgment for
simple possession, a lesser-included offense. Id. at 452. The court held that:
[W]here two individuals simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a
drug for their own use, intending only to share it together, their only crime is
personal drug abuse-simple joint possession, without any intent to dis-
tribute the drug further. Since both acquire possession from the outset and
neither intends to distribute the drug to a third person, neither serves as a
link in the chain of distribution. For purposes of the [Controlled Substances]
Act they must therefore be treated as possessors for personal use rather than
for further distribution. Their simple joint possession does not pose any of
the evils which Congress sought to deter and punish through the more se-
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one where the defendant purchased the drugs himself and shared
them with another person at a later point in time.107 In such a case,
most courts have viewed these defendants as "the link between the
person with whom [the defendant] intended to share the [drug] and
the drug itself" and affirmed their convictions for unlawful delivery.'us
In contrast, at least one state court has held that one who purchases
drugs and gives them to another person at a later point in time to
share with that person has not "delivered" the drugs."
3. States Refusing to Eliminate the Agency Defense Under the
Controlled Substances Act
Most state courts, along with every federal court, eliminated the use
of the agency defense after the adoption of the "delivery" and "distri-
bution" portions of the Controlled Substances Act into their statutory
regimes." 0 This elimination made the defense unavailable to agents
who actually handled drugs in a transaction,"' as well as to agents
vere penalties provided for those engaged in a "continuing criminal enter-
prise" or in drug distribution.
Id at 450; see also People v. Edwards, 702 P.2d 555, 559 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (finding
that individuals who are "truly 'equal partners"' cannot reasonably be said to have
supplied heroin to each other). The Edwards court observed that it expects "there
will be few cases involving a copurchase by truly equal partners," because a
copurchaser who takes a more active role in the purchase is guilty of -furnishing"
drugs to the less involved purchaser. Id, at 559 n.5.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that two defendants who purchased cocaine for later use by two other defendants
could be found guilty of "distribution"); United States v. Wright, 593 F.2d 105, 107
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a defendant who left a woman's dwelling to purchase
heroin and later returned to share it with her could be found guilty of "distribution"
of a controlled substance); State v. Moore, 529 N.W.2d 264, 265 (Iowa 1995) (finding
that a defendant who purchased methamphetamine by himself and later injected his
wife with it was guilty of "delivery" of a controlled substance). The Wright court
distinguished the facts in its case from the facts in Swiderski, observing that '[this is
not a case in which two individuals proceeded together to a place where they simulta-
neously purchased a controlled substance for their personal use." Wright, 593 F.2d at
108.
108. Wright, 593 F.2d at 108.
109. In State v. Carithers, 490 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1992). the two defendants
purchased heroin by themselves before sharing it with their respective spouses, who
later died of drug overdoses. Id. at 621. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that
the defendants had not "transferred" or "delivered" the heroin, despite the fact that
they obtained the heroin outside the presence of their co-purchasers. Id. at 622-23.
The court found that "[i]f a husband and wife jointly acquire the drug, each spouse
has constructive possession from the moment of acquisition, whether or not both are
physically present at the transaction." Id. at 622. It is not clear from the court's deci-
sion whether the co-purchasers need to be a husband and wife in order for this hold-
ing to apply.
110. See supra notes 81 & 95 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Webber v. State, 692 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that a defendant who actually transferred or attempted to transfer drugs could not use
the agency defense); People v. Williams, 221 N.W.2d 204, 205 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974)
(same); Wood v. Commonwealth, 197 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Va. 1973) (same).
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who did not touch the drugs at all, but merely participated in some
manner in the exchange.' 12 At least one state court, however, has
kept the defense alive in the latter situation. In State v. Lott,' 3 the
defendant appealed his conviction and sentence under the Iowa Code
for delivery of cocaine." 4 In Lott, a government informant, Clifford
"Kip" Moore, told the defendant that he and his partners would
purchase as many drugs as the defendant could obtain." 5 The defend-
ant agreed to the informant's proposition, and eventually arranged a
meeting between the informant, undercover agent Roger Timko pos-
ing as an additional drug buyer, and an individual named Andrew
Dains, who was to supply the drugs to Timko and Moore." 6 Dains
eventually sold one-half ounce of cocaine to Timko and Moore.11 7
Although the defendant did not actually hand the drugs to Timko and
Moore, he was present at the sale." 8 The defendant was charged and
convicted of unlawful delivery, on the theory that he aided and abet-
ted the ultimate purchasers of the cocaine. 1 9 On appeal, the State
argued that one who either purchases drugs, or aids and abets in the
purchase of drugs, is guilty of delivery under the Iowa Code, modeled
on the Federal Controlled Substances Act.120
The Iowa Supreme Court was not persuaded by the State's argu-
ment. The court observed that under Iowa law, an aider and abettor
is culpable for the crime of his principal.' 2' In the present case, the
government argued that the principals of the crime of unlawful deliv-
ery were the ultimate purchasers of the cocaine, namely, Timko and
Moore.12 2 In response to this argument, the court held that a cus-
tomer cannot be found guilty of participating in the delivery of co-
caine under the Iowa Code, 123 and concluded that "because the
deliverer is not the [customer], one who aids only the [customer] can-
not be guilty of delivery.' 1 4 In applying the agency defense to the
112. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
113. 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1977).
114. See Iowa Code Ann. § 124.401(1) (West 1997) (formerly codified at Iowa Code
§ 204.401) (prohibiting the "delivery" of a controlled substance).
115. Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 106.
116. Id. at 106-07.
117. Id. at 107.
118. See id. at 107-08.
119. Id. at 107.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Iowa Code Ann. § 703.1 (West 1993) (formerly codified at Iowa
Code Ann. § 688.1) (providing criminal liability for one who "aids and abets" a princi-
pal in the commission of a crime).
122. See Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 107.
123. Id. The conclusion that the ultimate purchaser of drugs cannot be convicted of
"delivery" is hardly unique to Iowa. For a look at other jurisdictions which conclude
that the ultimate purchaser is not guilty of delivery, see supra note 103 and accompa-
nying text.
124. Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 107.
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defendant, the court relied on United States v. Moses,"5 a Third Cir-
cuit case decided "under an analogous federal statute."" 6 Although
the Lott court affirmed the defendant's conviction because the de-
fendant did, in fact, aid and abet the seller in this particular case," 7 it
accepted the viability of the agency defense in a situation where a de-
fendant does not physically transfer the controlled substance to the
ultimate purchaser, 128 despite the new statutory scheme which penal-
ized the "delivery" of drugs."29 Because of its unique interpretation of
the Controlled Substances Act, however, Iowa has been the subject of
criticism.130
Other states have also found ways to save the agency defense from
statutes resembling the Controlled Substances Act. In a state where
the proscribed activity is "delivery" or "distribution,"'' the agency
defense may still be viable in a case where the prosecution's bill of
particulars alleges that a defendant committed the distribution of the
drug exclusively by selling it.' 32 For example, in the Hawaii case of
State v. Erickson,33 the defendant appealed from a conviction of pro-
125. 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955).
126. Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 107.
127. The court found substantial evidence indicating that the defendant was too
deeply involved in the transaction to be categorized as a mere extension of the buyer.
Id. at 108. This included, among other things, the defendant's vouching for the quality
of the cocaine to Timko and the defendant's willingness to arrange future sales be-
tween these men. Id The court, therefore, refused to allow the defendant to use the
agency defense as a protection against the delivery charge. Id.
128. There can be no doubt that the court knew it was applying the agency defense
to the defendant. See State v. Burden, 948 P.2d 991, 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (ob-
serving that the "procuring agent" defense, in which "a person acting as the agent of
the purchaser can[not] be charged as an accomplice to the delivery," only has support
in Iowa); State v. Grace, 812 P.2d 865, 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (observing that
Iowa is the only state "in which the procuring agent defense has been held to remain
viable in a jurisdiction which has adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act").
129. In a later case, the Iowa Supreme Court made it clear that an agent who does,
in fact, physically transfer a controlled substance to the ultimate purchaser may be
convicted of unlawful delivery. See State v. Zaruba, 306 N.W.2d 772,774 (Iowa 1981)
(holding that one who acts purely on behalf of a buyer of cocaine may still be con-
victed of unlawful delivery when "the defendant makes the actual delivery of the con-
trolled substance" to the buyer (emphasis added)).
130. See Grace, 812 P.2d at 867-68 (describing Iowa's interpretation of the delivery
statute as "an anomaly" and suggesting that Iowa's "reliance on Moses as viable law
in the Third Circuit is misplaced"); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 227, 232 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that Iowa's reasoning in Lott "is not persuasive"). For a more
thorough discussion of the criticism of the Lon decision and a response to that criti-
cism, see infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simione, 291 A.2d 764, 766-67 & n.9 (Pa. 1972)
(holding that the government was limited by its bill of particulars to proving that the
defendant committed a "sale" of a controlled substance, and that the government
failed to prove that the defendant had engaged in "delivery" or "distribution").
133. 586 P.2d 1022 (Haw. 1978).
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moting a detrimental drug in the first degree.13 1 The trial court had
ordered the State to furnish a bill of particulars to the defendant, in-
cluding a detailed description of the facts surrounding the case.135
The State complied with the court's request and alleged that the de-
fendant offered or agreed to sell Sgt. Howard Tagomori, an under-
cover officer, some marijuana. 13 6 The evidence revealed that Sgt.
Tagamori met the defendant at the house of a police informant, asked
the defendant to obtain some marijuana for him, and arrested the de-
fendant when he later returned to the house. 137 The State contended
that these facts supported the defendant's conviction under Hawaii
law, which defines "distribute" as "to sell, transfer, give, or deliver to
another, or to leave, barter, or exchange with another, or to offer or
agree to do the same."' 38
The Hawaii Supreme Court disagreed with the State and reversed
the defendant's conviction.' 39 The court initially observed that it
agreed with "the substantial body of cases" which have held that one
who acts as a purchasing agent of the buyer of an illegal drug cannot
be convicted of selling the drug. 4 Next, the court held that although
the charge against the defendant was "distribution" of drugs, the State
was limited by the bill of particulars to prove that the defendant com-
mitted a "sale" or an agreement to sell.' 4 ' Finally, the court con-
cluded that because the State failed to prove that the defendant was
associated with the supplier in the promotion of marijuana sales, the
defendant could not be convicted of promotion of a detrimental
drug.14
2
The Hawaii Supreme Court made it clear in later cases that the pre-
cedent of Erickson can only be applied to a narrow set of factual cir-
134. Id. at 1022-23. Under Hawaii law, one who promoted a drug means that one
distributed it. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1247(l)(0 (1993) ("A person commits the
offense of promoting a detrimental drug in the first degree if the person knowingly
distributes ... marijuana .. ").
135. Erickson, 586 P.2d at 1023. The purpose of a bill of particulars is "to enable
the defendant to prepare for trial and prevent surprise." State v. Harper, 620 P.2d
1087, 1091 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980). Furthermore, the government is not permitted to
obtain a conviction of a defendant on charges other than those mentioned in the bill
of particulars. See 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments and Informations § 160 (1995) ("It is the
general rule that when facts are detailed in a bill of particulars, the prosecution will be
confined at trial to proof of the facts so specified.").
It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to instruct the government to
produce a bill of particulars. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 881 P.2d 1218, 1225-26 (Haw.
1994) (holding that the defendant cannot force the government to produce a bill of
particulars).
136. Erickson, 586 P.2d at 1023.
137. Id. As it turned out, the defendant ended up not buying any marijuana for the
officer because he was "getting bad vibes." Id.
138. Id. (quoting Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1240 (11) (1993)).






cumstances. In State v. Reed,143 for example, the court stated that
Erickson "simply stands for the limited proposition that the [agency]
defense becomes available only when a bill of particulars alleges that
the defendant distributed a dangerous drug exclusively by selling it ...
and fails to allege any of the other statutorily proscribed methods of
distribution." 1" Implicit in the Hawaii Supreme Court's analysis is
the broader proposition that courts recognize the inherent injustice in
convicting purchasing agents of unlawful delivery. Thus, they take ad-
vantage of any legal opportunity, however rare, to protect the agents,
without going as far as the Iowa court did in Lott.
Further, it is clear that in states which have adopted a "delivery,"
"distribution," or another similar statute, the courts did not necessar-
ily abandon the agency defense as a result. Indeed, these courts have
not generally rejected the theory that an agent of the buyer cannot be
convicted of unlawful sale; rather, they have simply held that the de-
fense is not applicable to statutes prohibiting "delivery" or "distribu-
tion."145 This differentiation is especially significant in states which
prohibit sale as a distinct offense from other, more all-encompassing
activities (such as "delivery," "distribution," "furnishing," or "promot-
ing"),"4 because the agency defense has more legal support when ap-
plied to sale statutes rather than "delivery" or "distribution" statutes.
143. 881 P.2d 1218 (Haw. 1994).
144. Id. at 1226.
145. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murillo, 589 N.E.2d 340, 341-42 (Mass. Ct. App.
1992) (upholding the defendant's conviction for unlawful trafficking in more than 200
grams of cocaine, but acknowledging that "[w]hen a defendant is charged with selling
narcotics and there is evidence that he acted in the transaction solely to assist the
buyer in acquiring the narcotics, a procuring agent instruction may be appropriate"
(emphasis added)).
146. See Ala. Code. § 13A-12-211(a) (1994) ("A person commits the crime of un-
lawful distribution of controlled substances if, except as otherwise authorized, he sells,
furnishes, gives away, manufactures, delivers or distributes a controlled substance
... ."); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3405(A)(4) (Vest 1989 & Supp. 1997) ("A person
shall not knowingly transport for sale .... sell, transfer or offer to sell or transfer
marijuana."); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11352(a) (West 1991) (providing criminal
liability for "every person who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, ad-
ministers, or gives away ... any controlled substance"); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-
405(1)(a) (1997) ("[Ilt is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, dispense,
sell, distribute, possess, or to possess with intent to manufacture, dispense, sell, or
distribute a controlled substance .... "); Kan. Stat. Ann § 65-4164 (Supp. 1997) ("[lit
shall be unlawful for any person to possess, have under such person's control, pre-
scribe, administer, deliver, distribute, dispense, compound, [or] sell ... any controlled
substance .... "); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 218A. 010(24), 218A.1404(1) (Michie 1995)
(prohibiting the trafficking of any controlled substance. while defining "traffic" as "to
manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A,
§§ 1101(17)(C), 1103(1) (Vest 1983 & 1997 Supp.) (prohibiting the -unlawful traffick-
ing in a scheduled drug," while defining "trafficking" as "to sell, barter, trade, ex-
change or otherwise furnish for consideration"); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-9-101(1)
(1997) ("A person commits the offense of criminal sale of dangerous drugs if the
person sells, barters, exchanges, gives away... any dangerous drug .... ); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 453.321(1) (1996) ("[I]t is unlawful for a person to import, transport, manufac-
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The importance of this distinction is highlighted by the Alabama
case of Hill v. State.14 7 In Hill, the defendant appealed his conviction
under a statute holding that "any person who possesses, sells, fur-
nishes, gives away, obtains, or attempts to obtain by fraud ... con-
trolled substances . .. is guilty of a felony."' 48 The government
charged the defendant under the "sale" portion of the statute, alleging
that the defendant did "unlawfully sell marijuana."' 49 After a thor-
ough analysis of various applications of drug laws by different jurisdic-
tions,15° the court held that because the government charged the agent
with sale, rather than another portion of the statute, the agent could
not be held criminally responsible for unlawful sale if he did not par-
ticipate with the seller in making the sale.15 1
Acceptance of the agency defense has been seriously eroded as a
result of the Controlled Substances Act and similar state statutes.
Nonetheless, a number of courts, recognizing the fundamental unfair-
ness of applying such severe punishment to purchasing agents, con-
tinue to keep the defense alive in one form or another. Because of the
meaningful culpability and legal justifications underlying the defense,
discussed below in part III, courts that have completely abandoned
the defense should consider resurrecting it.
III. REINVENTING THE AGENCY DEFENSE
In a number of states, the agency defense is still recognized as a
defense to charges of unlawful sale 5 ' and, in Iowa, delivery.153 None-
theless, the agency defense has undoubtedly received far less than
ture, compound, sell, exchange, barter, supply, prescribe, dispense, give away or ad-
minister a controlled or counterfeit substance .... ); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-
B:2(1) (1995) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have
under his control, sell, [or] purchase ... any controlled drug.. . ."); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 220.31 (McKinney 1989) ("A person is guilty of criminal sale of a controlled sub-
stance ... when he knowingly and unlawfully sells a controlled substance."); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1) (1996) ("[I]t is unlawful for any person [t]o manufacture, sell
or deliver... a controlled substance."); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(1)-(4) (1997)
(prohibiting the manufacture, delivery, sale, or possession of a controlled substance);
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-248.1 (Michie 1996) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to
sell, give, distribute or possess with intent to sell, give or distribute marijuana.").
147. 348 So. 2d 848 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977).
148. Id. at 849 (citation omitted). The current Alabama statute closely resembles
the one in force when Hill was decided. See supra note 146.
149. Hill, 348 So. 2d at 848.
150. Id. at 850-55.
151. Id. at 855.
152. See id.; People v. McGhee, 677 P.2d 419, 421 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Erickson, 586 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Haw. 1978); State v. Schilling, 712 P.2d 1233, 1239(Kan. 1986); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Mass. 1969); Love v.
State. 893 P.2d 376, 378 (Nev. 1995); People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 214 (N.Y.
1978); State v. Day, 540 A.2d 1042, 1042 (Vt. 1987). Until very recently, Tennessee
also adhered to the agency defense. Compare State v. Baldwin, 867 S.W.2d 358, 360
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (recognizing the "procuring agent" defense), with State v.
Porter, CCA No. 02C01-9501-CC-00029, 1997 WL 399335, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App.
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unanimous approval in federal and state courts in later years.15 This
can largely be attributed to the passage of the Federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act and similar state statutes.'5 5 Some states, however, have
never recognized the agency defense as a defense to a charge of un-
lawful sale of drugs, irrespective of the Controlled Substances Act.1 6
All states that do not allow the use of the agency defense should seri-
ously reconsider doing so, for both culpability and legal reasons.
A. Culpability Reasons to Bring Back the Agency Defense
The general goal of criminal law is to prevent crime,15 7 although
there is debate over what the justification for punishment should
be.' 58 As convicted defendants continue to face increasingly severe
July 16, 1997) (holding that the "procuring agent" defense was eliminated by the Ten-
nessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989).
The agency defense in Colorado and Kansas has been recently eliminated by these
states' legislatures. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-22-324 (1997) ("The common law de-
fense known as the 'procuring agent defense' is not a defense to any crime . .. ");
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-4160(d), 4161(e), 4162(b), 4163(c), 4164(b) (Supp. 1997) ("It
shall not be a defense to charges arising under th[ese] sectionfs] that the defendant
was acting in an agency relationship on behalf of any other party in a transaction
involving a controlled substance.").
153. See State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Iowa 1977). Further, several states
provide a reduced sentence for agents who can show that the transfer of certain con-
trolled substances was solely an accommodation for another individual, with no intent
to profit from the transaction. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4763(b)(1)(c) & (b)(2)(d)
(1995); Iowa Code Ann. § 124.410 (West 1997) (applicable to one ounce or less of
marijuana); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-460 (Law Co-op. 1985); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-
248.1(b) (Michie 1996); Stillwell v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 360, 364 (Va. 1978)
(observing that the accommodation statute "provides for the mitigation of punish-
ment for those who are less culpable").
154. See supra notes 81 & 95 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 72-79, 93-95 and accompanying text.
156. These states include Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, and New
Hampshire. See State v. Baltier, 505 P.2d 556, 557 (Ariz. 1973); People v. Edwards,
702 P.2d 555, 559 n.5 (Cal. 1985); Diana v. State, 298 S.E.2d 281, 281 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982); People v. Shannon, 155 N.E.2d 578, 580 (I11. 1959); State v. Deering, 611 A.2d
972, 974 (Me. 1992); State v. Stone, 316 A.2d 196, 197 (N.H. 1974).
157. Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 11 (1991) ("[Tihe overall or
justifying aim of the criminal law is general prevention .... ").
158. There are two general theories of criminal law: utilitarianism and retributiv-
ism. See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 2.03[B]-[C], at 9-13 (2d ed.
1995) (observing that the two justifications for criminal punishment are utilitarianism
and retributivism); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 453, 454 (1997) (same). Utilitarianism focuses solely on the costs and
benefits to society as a whole for determining punishment. See Dressler, supra,
§ 2.03[B][1], at 9 ("According to classical utilitarianism ... the purpose of all laws is
to maximize the net happiness of society." (footnote omitted)); Charles E. Torcia,
Wharton's Criminal Law § 1, at 3 (15th ed. 1993) ("[Tlhe utilitarian theories ...
would use punishment as a means to an end-the end being community protection by
the prevention of crime."); Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tar Annesty: Crime and Punish-
ment Revisited, 10 Va. Tax Rev. 535, 573 (1991) ("With a purely deterrent model of
punishment, the focus is away from giving the wrongdoer his just desserts [sic]; moral
culpability, proportionality, and the gravity of the harm are irrelevant in determining
the type and degree of punishment." (footnote omitted)); Louis Michael Seidman,
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penalties under our drug laws,159 lawmakers have apparently given lit-
tle attention to determining the proper culpability level of these de-
fendants. 160  The agency defense is, quite simply, an attempt to
preserve fairness in our criminal justice system, by assuring that agents
are assigned the level of culpability that is appropriate for their ac-
tions.161 This concern with fairness is illustrated by comparing the
agency defense to entrapment.
Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Con-
trol, 94 Yale L.J. 315, 320-21 (1984) (noting that the utilitarian model does not equate
"the degree of punishment to the degree of fault" and "permits extremely high (some
might say barbarous) punishment levels"). Retributivism, on the other hand, deter-
mines punishment based upon the defendant's appropriate moral culpability, that is,
giving the defendant his or her "just deserts." See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Re-
sponsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 36 (1968) ("[N]o one shall be punished
in the absence of the basic condition of moral culpability."); Jeffrie G. Murphy &
Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence 121 (1990)
(stating that retributivism focuses on a "cluster of moral concepts: rights, desert,
merit, moral responsibility, and justice"); Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitu-
tion, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 157, 159
(1996) ("According to a retributivist approach, we get even by punishing a criminal
according to his desert .... " (emphasis omitted)).
159. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 50, at 42 (observing that recent Congres-
sional crime bills have been "especially punitive to drug offenders"); Bowman, supra
note 1, at 972 ("Harsher enforcement of drug laws has been only one component,
albeit a prominent one, of a national movement toward tougher sanctions for all
crimes."); Paul D. Carrington, Good Sense and 21, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 987, 987
(1995) (observing that "the penalties for drug law violations are excessive").
160. Presently, the legislators designing our drug laws seem to have adopted the
utilitarian approach to punishment. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to do With
It?: The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the
Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 56 (1997) ("It
seems doubtful whether drug offenses evoke the strongest retributive impulses."); Mi-
chele H. Kalstein et al., Calculating Injustice: The Fixation on Punishment as Crime
Control, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 575, 576-77 (1992) (suggesting that current policy-
makers have adopted the obedience model to crime, which is rooted in utilitarian
logic and adopts a system "toward the extreme of punishing people with no regard for
their culpability"); Ilene H. Nagel, Foreward, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 883, 914 n.190
(1990) (suggesting that "in the area of crimes related to drugs, crime control goals
rather than just deserts ... prevail"); Joe Rigert, Harsh Reality: Life Without Parole,
Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Dec. 14, 1997, at A16 ("Under U.S. drug laws, sentences are
based more on drug amounts than on the degree of culpability.").
161. A more sensible approach to the drug problem is to adopt the retributive the-
ory of criminal law. This is especially true for purchasing agents, whose culpability
level appears to be more appropriately placed at the level of the buyer rather than the
seller. In other words, treating an agent of the buyer identically with the buyer him-
self or herself is a more "just" result. See Steven B. Wasserman, Toward Sentencing
Reform for Drug Couriers, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 643, 650 (1995) (contending that, in a
drug case, if "the equitable principle of just deserts were paramount," a defendant's
relationship to the supplier, as well as his or her "role and stake in the drug enter-
prise," would all be important issues); see also Susan F. Mandiberg, Moral Issues in
Environmental Crime, 7 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 881, 881 (1996) (suggesting that the basis
of criminal law is its "culpability-based moral underpinnings"); Stephen J. Morse,
Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 113, 121
AGENCY DEFENSE
1. An Analysis of the Entrapment Doctrine and its Similarities to
the Agency Defense
A strong culpability justification for preserving the agency defense
is already entrenched in United States jurisprudence for a similar de-
fense available to criminal defendants: entrapment. The defense of
entrapment commonly arises when the government induces an indi-
vidual into committing a crime that he or she was not otherwise
predisposed to commit. 162 If successfully applied, the entrapment de-
fense results in a complete acquittal for the defendant. 63 Many states
have officially codified the entrapment defense; 6 however, there is
no federal entrapment statute.165
Although entrapment had previously been recognized in lower fed-
eral circuit courts,"6 the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the
defense for the first time in Sorrells v. United States.167 In Sorrells, the
defendant, a veteran of World War I, appealed his conviction for pos-
session and sale of a 1/2 gallon of whisky in violation of the National
Prohibition Act."6 The evidence revealed that an undercover agent
posing as a tourist visited the defendant's home, accompanied by
three men who knew the defendant well.169 The agent informed the
defendant that he, too, was an army veteran and a former member of
(1996) ("[T]he moral legitimacy of the criminal law requires that offenders receive
punishments that are proportionate to their culpability.").
Even under the utilitarian approach to drug control, it is questionable whether the
costs to society of locking up so many individuals as sellers outweigh the benefits. See
infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of the cur-
rent drug laws); Tracy Huling, Women Drug Couriers: Sentencing Reform Needed For
Prisoners of War, 9 Crim. Just. 14, 61 (Winter 1995) (observing that some judges have
refused to handle drug cases "because of the harsh sentences imposed on drug mules
and other low-level drug offenders"); Stephen Chapman, Editorial, Criminal Behav-
ior: In the Drug War, Toughness Has Become Stupidity, Chi. Trib., Feb. 9, 1995, at 27
(arguing that the tough sentencing of the criminal justice system "squanders far too
many of its resources" on low-level drug offenders).
162. See John David Buretta, Note, Reconfiguring the Entrapment and Outrageous
Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 Geo. LJ. 1945, 1945 (1996).
163. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 2-12(b) (West 1995) ("[A] person prosecuted for
an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his
conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.").
164. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-206 (West Supp. 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 53a-15 (West 1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 432 (1995); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 51
7-12 (West Supp. 1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 505.010 (Michie 1990); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 40.05 (McKinney 1998); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.06 (West 1994); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-303 (1995).
165. See Buretta, supra note 162, at 1955 ("Congress has specifically refused to
adopt a federal entrapment statute despite repeated recommendations from practi-
tioners and commentators.").
166. See Gargano v. United States, 24 F.2d 625, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1928); Butts v.
United States, 273 F. 35, 37-38 (8th Cir. 1921); Woo Vai v. United States, 223 F. 412,
415-16 (9th Cir. 1915).
167. 287 U.S. 435, 437 (1932).
168. Id. at 438-39.
169. ld. at 439.
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the same Division as the defendant. 170 The agent then asked the de-
fendant at least three different times if the defendant could obtain
some whisky for him.171 After the third request, the defendant finally
relented and purchased some whisky for the agent. 172 At his trial, the
defendant attempted to use entrapment as a defense, but the trial
court refused to allow him to do so. 173 The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the defendant's conviction, holding that the entrapment defense was
inapplicable to these facts. 174
The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in failing to
consider the entrapment defense.' 75 The Court first observed that
nearly every federal circuit had approved the use of entrapment as a
defense.'76 In this particular case, the Court found that the govern-
ment agent clearly "[took] advantage of the sentiment aroused by re-
miniscences of [the defendant and the agent's] experiences as
companions in arms in the World War.' 1 7 7 The Court next focused on
the design of the National Prohibition Act itself; it held that in enact-
ing the Prohibition statute, Congress could not have intended that the
statute's "processes of detection and enforcement should be abused
by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of per-
sons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to
punish them."' 78 The Court further found that allowing the govern-
ment to proceed as they did would be "abhorrent to the sense of jus-
tice,' 1 79 and concluded that the "requirements of the highest public
policy" mandated reversal of the defendant's conviction.', 0
The Supreme Court has consistently divided between two different
viewpoints on the culpability justifications for maintaining an entrap-
ment defense. The subjective view of entrapment, which has been
adopted by a majority of the courts,'"' focuses on whether the defend-
ant was "predisposed," or previously inclined, to commit a crime, even
before being approached by government agents or informants.8 2 On




173. Id. at 438.
174. See id. at 442.
175. Id. at 452.
176. Id. at 443; see supra note 166.
177. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.
178. Id. at 448.
179. Id. at 449.
180. Id. at 448.
181. See infra notes 182-83.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-36 (1973); State v. Florez,
636 A.2d 1040, 1047 (N.J. 1994) ("Subjective entrapment occurs when the police im-
plant a criminal plan into the mind of an innocent person who would not ordinarily
have committed the offense."); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 628, 631 (Va.
Ct. App. 1989) ("Where one is predisposed to commit a criminal act.., it cannot be
said that the state provided an innocent person with the intent to commit a crime.").
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whether the government engaged in overzealous tactics in its attempt
to apprehend criminals, without regard to the defendant's criminal
predisposition. 18 3
The agency defense was created in response to very similar con-
cerns to those that the doctrine of entrapment addresses, in terms of
the assessment of the proper culpability of defendants. The fact that
defendants often raise the agency defense simultaneously with entrap-
ment "is not mere coincidence. Evidence of entrapment will often
also be evidence that the defendant entered into the illegal transaction
solely to help the buyer, and on his behalf.'""W Both agency and en-
trapment recognize that courts should be especially cautious when
government agents are involved in instigating crime.las By closely an-
alyzing the subjective and objective justifications for the entrapment
defense, it becomes clear that these justifications have similar impor-
tance to the agency defense.'86 Thus, the agency defense can be justi-
fied for essentially the same reasons as entrapment.
The subjective view of entrapment is currently the majority view, on both the state
and federal level. See Vega v. People, 893 P.2d 107, 119 (Colo. 1995) (en bane); State
v. Jurgensen, 681 A.2d 981, 988 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Vazquez v. State, 700 So. 2d 5,
10-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tenn. 1997);
State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wash. 1996) (en bane).
183. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383-84 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The objective view of entrapment is a minority view. See Shuck, 953
S.W.2d at 666 ("The objective test [of entrapment] is the minority rule ... ."). None-
theless, it still enjoys strong support. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-206(c) (West
Supp. 1997) ("The conduct of law enforcement officers and their agents may be con-
sidered in determining if a person has proven entrapment."); Jacobs v. State, No. A-
5882, 1998 WL 66136, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1998); People v. Holloway, 55
Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 550 (Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Clark, 683 A.2d 901, 904
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
Further, some jurisdictions apply both the subjective and objective tests when con-
sidering an entrapment claim by the defendant. See State v. Riccardi, 665 A.2d 793,
796 (NJ. Super Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding that the entrapment defense has both
subjective and objective considerations); State v. Dartez, No. 17104, 1997 WL 816259,
at *7 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1997) (same); State v. Barnes, 551 N.W.2d 279, 283
(N.D. 1996) (same).
184. United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570, 572 (1st Cir. 1970).
185. See Foster, supra note 10, at 279.
186. One possible criticism of applying the culpability justifications of entrapment
to the agency defense is that "[w]hile entrapment is available only when the party
soliciting the transaction is a public official, the agency defense may be used regard-
less of the identity of the ultimate buyer." Elaine Robinson McHale, Note, The
Agency Defense in Narcotics Sales Prosecutions: A Judicial Loophole in the New York
Drug Laws, 52 St. John's L. Rev. 594, 615 (1978); see also Foster, supra note 10, at 280
(observing that the underlying justifications for entrapment do not apply to the
agency defense unless an agent for the state is involved in a particular case). This
criticism can be countered, however, because the vast majority of agency cases do
involve either a government informant or an undercover officer, see infra note 200
and accompanying text, thereby raising the same morality concerns as the entrapment
defense does. Further, there are additional culpability justifications besides those
presented by the entrapment doctrine which justify the use of the agency defense. See




One focus of the entrapment defense is to prevent convictions of
defendants who were not otherwise predisposed towards committing a
crime.187 The Supreme Court recently articulated that "[g]overnment
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent
person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then in-
duce commission of the crime so that the [g]overnment may prose-
cute."' 88 The Court stressed that judges need to step in if government
agents persist in creating this inducement. 18 9 Further, the significance
of the entrapment doctrine is heightened when one considers that "re-
cent Congresses have had decreasing sympathy for defendants, re-
gardless of whether the defendants were 'induced' to commit
crime."'
1 90
The agency defense shares the same underlying concerns as entrap-
ment in the context of the defendant's predisposition to commit a
crime. In order to successfully invoke the agency defense, a defendant
must show that he or she was acting purely on behalf of a purchaser of
drugs, and was in no way associated with the seller. 19' In other words,
the agency defense can only be applied when the agent was not
"predisposed" to act on behalf of the seller of the drugs."9 By defini-
tion, then, such an agent had no previous inclination to commit the
criminal act of possessing and selling drugs until the buyer made a
request to the agent to do so. Therefore, the concerns presented by
the Supreme Court regarding the defendant's predisposition to com-
mit a crime should apply with equal force to a purchasing agent; it is
simply improper for a defendant who had no previous intent to act on
behalf of a drug seller, but merely acts upon request from the buyer,
to be treated as though he or she is as culpable as a seller.
187. See Thomas G. Briody, The Government Made Me Do It - The Changing
Landscape on the Law of Entrapment, 45 R.I. B.J., Mar. 1997, at 15 ("A criminal
defendant, induced by government agents to commit a crime when he or she lacked
predisposition to engage in the illegal conduct, is entitled to acquittal."); Note, En-
trapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1122, 1122 (1982) ("The
criminal defense of entrapment protects defendants against law enforcement conduct
aimed at securing a prosecution by inducing the commission of a criminal offense.").
188. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992); see also Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (finding that Congress had no intention of
punishing innocent people who are drawn into criminal violations by the
government).
189. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54.
190. Buretta, supra note 162, at 1955.
191. See supra notes 9 & 36 and accompanying text.
192. See People v. Brathwaite, 655 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (App. Div. 1997) (holding
that both entrapment and agency defenses "may be rebutted by evidence showing
criminal predisposition"); State v. DeJesus, No. 66847, 1995 WL 79788, at *5 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1995) (finding that the defendant's "active solicitation of [drug]




In concurrence in a later Supreme Court case, Sherman v. United
States, 93 Justice Frankfurter argued that the focus on the predisposi-
tion of the defendant to commit the crime was irrelevant, because
such an approach "loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense
of entrapment."'' 94 Rather, he recommended that the Court focus
solely on the conduct of the government when determining whether a
defendant was entrapped:
No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations
to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation
of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into fitrther crime is
not to be tolerated by an advanced society.... Appeals to sympathy,
friendship, the possibility of exorbitant gain, and so forth, can no
more be tolerated when directed against a past offender than
against an ordinary law-abiding citizen.' 95
Justice Frankfurter suggested that the objective analysis of police con-
duct, unlike the subjective dissemination of the defendant's predispo-
sition, is based on the sentiments that led to the creation of the
entrapment defense in the first place.' 96 He also observed that the
objective approach advances the ultimate goal of entrapment cases-
to secure public faith in the honest and equitable administration of
justice.' 9 7 Justice Frankfurter concluded that while the objective ap-
proach assures that "[p]ast crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal
and open him to police practices ... from which the ordinary citizen is
protected,"'198 the subjective approach "runs afoul of fundamental
principles of equality under law, and would espouse the notion that
when dealing with the criminal classes anything goes."'"9
The agency defense also recognizes the need for the protection of
individuals from overzealous law enforcement tactics. This protection
is especially vital "in an era where law enforcement officials, in an
193. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
194. Id- at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Hawaiian Legislature described
the purpose of its entrapment statute as follows:
The real basis for the defense of entrapment is a purpose to deter improper
conduct on the part of law enforcement officials. The harm done by increas-
ing the risk of penal conduct by otherwise innocent persons, the improper
utilization of police resources, the suspicion that entrapment tactics are the
result of personal malice, and injury to the stature of law enforcement insti-
tutions, all contribute to condemn entrapment. Providing a defense to con-
duct which would otherwise be a basis for penal liability because of
improper tactics of law enforcement officials is an extreme measure, but no
other, more effective, method presents itself.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702-237 (1993) (commentary on § 702-237).
198. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter. J., concurring).
199. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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effort to combat the sale of illegal narcotics or other contraband, re-
sort increasingly to the use of undercover agents. 2 00 Further, there is
a particular concern for the increase in the use of confidential infor-
mants in these cases, who may be acting for promises of financial gain
or reduced sentences.20 1 The use of these credibility-deficient infor-
mants, combined with the natural eagerness of law enforcement offi-
cials to apprehend criminals, creates a "mixture with explosive
potential for abuse. '20 2 The agency defense, by protecting defendants
who often act purely on behalf of soliciting government officials, pro-
vides a check on this abuse by assuring that the government will meet
its continuing obligation to prevent the instigation of crime among its
citizens.20 3
200. Briody, supra note 187, at 15; see Mark Curriden, Secret Threat to Justice, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at Al (observing that between 1980 and 1993, the number of fed-
eral search warrants relying exclusively on an undercover agent increased from 24%
to 71%).
201. Briody, supra note 187, at 15; see Crowe v. State, 441 P.2d 90, 95 (Nev. 1968)
("[T]he use of informers is a dirty tactic for a dirty business that may raise serious
questions of credibility."); Evan Haglund, Note, Impeaching the Underworld Inform-
ant, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1405, 1407 (1990) ("[I]nformants are often tempted to lie in
order to ensure continued rewards .... [C]ourts often underestimate [informants']
potential to implicate innocent persons."); John Milne, Role of Informants Ques-
tioned, Boston Globe, Dec. 27, 1995, at 17 (noting the great increase of the use of
informants and the abuses resulting from the increase).
202. Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrap-
ment Defense, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1011, 1012 (1987). For example, the House Subcommit-
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, in response to hearings on the FBI's use of
undercover tactics in 1984, made the following observation:
The infiltration by government agents, or criminals who are financed by the
government, into the private lives of citizens; the spectacle of the United
States Government spending large sums of money to tempt people into com-
mitting crimes; and the atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and paranoia which
develops as the use of the technique expands, are all anathema to the values
protected and cherished in our Constitution.
... [T]hese [undercover] operations develop a momentum of their own,
with little if any meaningful review by any objective observers.
FBI Undercover Operations: Report of the Subcomm. on Civ. and Const. Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary: House of Representatives Together With Dissenting Views,
98th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-3 (Comm. Print 1984); see also Gary T. Marx, Undercover:
Police Surveillance in America 1-16 (1988) (discussing the vast expansion of under-
cover work in the United States and the subsequent public policy concerns which are
raised); Mark H. Moore, Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law
Enforcement, in ABSCAM Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement
18 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., 1983) ("In important areas of enforcement activity such as
informants, undercover operations, and grand jury investigations, constitutional prin-
ciples leave, perhaps, too much latitude to enforcement agencies."); Paul Finkelman,
The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and The War on Drugs, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1389, 1390 (1993) ("As the nation moves to a 'semi-martial state' in the war on drugs
it is likely that our fundamental liberties will continue to erode.").
203. Foster, supra note 10, at 280.
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(c) Agency: The Perfect Compromise
While there are convincing arguments for maintaining the entrap-
ment defense, acceptance of entrapment is not universal.20 In fact,
both viewpoints of entrapment have been the target of a wide variety
of criticism. This criticism stems from the debate over whether en-
trapment was designed to protect innocent defendants or to maintain
the uprightness of law enforcement.20 5 For example, a criticism of the
subjective view of entrapment is that legislatures intended to penalize
all criminal conduct, regardless of whether the government was in-
volved in the defendant's inducement.20 6 Further, these critics argue
that an examination of the defendant's predisposition would allow the
government to introduce "highly prejudicial evidence of the 'defend-
ant's bad reputation or past criminal activities' which, in turn, may
inflame the jury to convict the defendant because of the person's past
reputation or conduct. '20 7 In defense, proponents of subjective en-
trapment argue that the objective standard "encumbers the police
with too rigid a standard to govern its behavior. ' '2 1
The agency defense deals with the concerns of both proponents and
opponents of the doctrine of entrapment. First, agency furthers the
subjective and objective concerns upon which the entrapment defense
is based. It protects defendants who were not otherwise predisposed
to act on behalf of a seller of narcotics against the harsh penalties of
"sale" and "delivery" statutes, while also safeguarding defendants
from disreputable informants and overzealous law enforcement tac-
204. See, eg., Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our
Criminal Justice Dilemna, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111, 113 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds.)
(arguing that the entrapment doctrine is "one of a number of adaptive mechanisms
which compensate for our failure to develop a coherent theory of blame and choice to
regulate the imposition of criminal punishment"); Leslie G. Bleifuss, Note, Entrap-
ment and Jacobson v. United States: "Doesn't the Government Realize That They Can
Destroy a Man's Life?," 13 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 431, 431 (1993) (observing that "the
Supreme Court's ability to administer justice has been closely scrutinized and heavily
criticized for its formulation of the entrapment defense").
205. Jennifer Gregg, Note, Caught in the Web: Entrapment in Cyberspace, 19 Has-
tings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 157, 183 (1996).
206. Id.; see Christopher D. Moore, Comment, The Elusive Foundation of the En-
trapment Defense, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1151, 1157 (1995) ("If a private actor induced the
defendant to commit the offense, no entrapment defense would be available.").
207. Bleifuss, supra note 204, at 454 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
443 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see John D. Lombardo, Comment, Causation and
"Objective" Entrapmen" Toward a Culpability-Centered Approach, 43 UCLA L Rev.
209, 212 (1995) (arguing that evidence of a defendant's past conduct "raise[s] a
smokescreen and divert[s] ... attention from the acts now charged").
208. Brian Thomas Feeney, Note, Scrutiny for the Serpent. The Court Refines En-
trapment Law in Jacobson v. United States, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1027, 1046 (1993); see
Scott C. Paton, Note, "The Government Made Me Do It". A Proposed Approach to
Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 Cornell L Rev. 995, 1031 (1994)
(observing that the objective approach might establish strict standards of police con-
duct which may counter the needs of "effective government law enforcement through
the use of sting operations").
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tics. In addition to contributing this much-needed protection, how-
ever, the agency defense also responds to the criticisms and drawbacks
of entrapment, because it still provides some measure of criminal cul-
pability for purchasing agents. While a successful application of the
entrapment defense results in the complete acquittal of a defend-
ant,2" 9 a similarly successful use of the agency defense does not relieve
a criminal defendant of all culpability, because he or she can still be
convicted of unlawful possession of drugs.210 Therefore, the applica-
tion of the agency defense, as compared to entrapment, is "not as a
broadsword, but as a scalpel." ''
2. Additional Culpability Reasons for Preserving the Agency
Defense
In addition to the culpability concerns preserved by the entrapment
defense, there are additional reasons of fairness and morality that jus-
tify preserving the agency defense. Courts adopting the agency de-
fense have recognized the "medical and sociological aspects which
complicate the factual setting" in determining the proper culpability
of defendants who act purely on behalf of purchasers of drugs.212 As
the New York Court of Appeals declared, the agency defense was at
least partially designed to protect "those at the far end-who may in-
clude persons as diverse as impressionable students, victims of con-
tributing socioeconomic or medical problems, and others who have
been seduced by exposure to drugs to fall into a state of dependency
on them.
213
A criticism of the agency defense is that the agent makes it easier
for buyers to obtain drugs, and that agents "are an essential link in the
illicit drug traffic" who should be held to the same degree of culpabil-
ity as pure sellers.2 14 But this argument overlooks the fact that the
agent's "entire standing in the transaction is derived" from the pur-
209. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
211. Frank M. McCullock, The NLRB in Action, Address at the Eighth Annual
Joint Industrial Relations Conference of Michigan State University (Apr. 19, 1962) in
49 Lab. Rel. Reference Manual 74, 83 (1962).
212. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 211 (N.Y. 1978); see also Margaret P. Spen-
cer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 335, 342
(1995) ("A wide range of psychological, social and economic incentives can combine
to produce drug use and crime patterns that become firmly established in some
persons.").
213. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 211. Even a staunch opponent of the agency defense
acknowledged that the idea that states "could not have wished to treat more severely
than the actual buyer someone who can be denominated under some arcane mixture
of agency and penal concepts an agent of the buyer" has "a certain appeal to one's
innate sense of justice." Id. at 215 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting in part). For an analysis of
what constitutes "justice" in the criminal law, see supra notes 157-61 and accompany-
ing text.
214. People v. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200, 205 (N.Y. 1978); see also supra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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chaser. 15 In fact, drug sales could not even occur without the partici-
pation of willing buyers.216 As one judge recognizing this fact
observed:
A cab driver who transports a buyer to the scene also "facilitates" a
sale in this unrestricted sense of the word. Every purchaser of drugs
makes it easier, by his or her conduct, for a seller to sell. Indeed,
the purchaser's role is far more vital to the sale, and encourages it in
considerably greater measure, than . . . a buyer-sponsored
intermediary. 2 f
The judge also warned that if the courts continue aggressive and min-
dless application of drug statutes, the prison system will continue to
become crowded with minor, low-level drug offenders .2 1  Because the
buyer is just as crucial to the completion of a drug sale as the seller,
the treatment of an extension of the buyer as a seller does not reflect
the agents' true level of moral culpability. 219 The agency defense,
therefore, can be viewed as "a means of determining the extent of the
intermediary's culpability, and thus the nature of his crime, under a
statutory scheme which reserves the most severe penalties for the 'ty-
coons of the trade." ' 220
Further, the agency defense recognizes that our drug laws do not
procure benefits which outweigh the cost to society. 2 1 As one judge
215. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 211.
216. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 205.
217. Lowman v. United States, 632 A.2d 88,96 (D.C. 1993) (Schwelb, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). In Lowman, the Court upheld the conviction of the
defendant for unlawful distribution of drugs on an aiding and abetting theory. Id. at
89. The evidence showed that the defendant was approached by an undercover of-
ficer and eventually introduced the officer to a seller of drugs. Id. In his partial con-
currence, Judge Schwelb argued that:
[I]f everyone who assisted a buyer of drugs were thereby rendered a distrib-
utor, then, a fortiori, every purchaser would also logically have to be deemed
an aider and abettor to a felony, and would therefore be subject to a
mandatory minimum sentence. The consequence of such a construction of
the statute, however, would be "to write out of the Act the offense of simple
possession, since under such a theory every drug abuser would be liable for
aiding and abetting the distribution which has led to his own possession."
Id. at 96 (Schwelb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United
States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1977)).
218. Id. at 101 (Schwelb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The judge
further noted that "[t]he 'big enchiladas [of the drug trade],' meanwhile, seldom ven-
ture out into the street, and are far less likely to be apprehended." Id. (Schwelb, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. This argument also suggests
that there may be legal problems, in addition to moral concerns, in charging a
purchasing agent with aiding and abetting the seller. For a discussion on the inherent
legal difficulties in charging an agent of the buyer with aiding and abetting the seller,
see infra notes 242-73 and accompanying text.
220. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206.
221. An analysis of whether the benefits to administering punishment to defend-
ants outweigh their costs, without regard to the defendants' actual culpability, is the
utilitarian approach to criminal law. See supra note 158.
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observed, "[the] pragmatic value [of criminal penalties for drug in-
volvement] might well be questioned, since more than a half century
of increasingly severe sanctions has failed to stem, if indeed it has not
caused, a parallel crescendo of drug abuse. '2 22 Indeed, the massive
costs of spending on combating the drug problem arguably outweigh
the benefits gained for imprisoning so many low-level drug offenders
for so long.223
B. Legal Reasons to Bring Back the Agency Defense
In addition to the culpability justifications which exist for the pres-
ervation of the agency defense, there is legal support for it as well. It
is necessary to differentiate, however, between statutes prohibiting the
"sale" of drugs and statutes prohibiting the "delivery" of drugs. This
is because "delivery" statutes prohibit a wider range of activities than
those encompassed in typical "sale" statutes. These reasons will be
examined more fully below.
1. Preserving the Defense to Prosecution for Unlawful "Delivery"
of Drugs
It is possible to argue that the agency defense can be reconciled
with the Controlled Substances Act and similar state statutes. As out-
lined earlier in this Note, the Iowa Supreme Court adheres to this
view,224 although it has been strongly criticized for maintaining such a
position.2 The fundamental criticism of the Iowa court in reaching
its decision in Lott is that the court improperly relied on "a 1955 fed-
eral case decided before enactment of the current federal act under
which a 'procuring agent' defense has been rejected.212 6 The 1955
federal case to which the Iowa court referred is United States v.
Moses. 27 The Moses court held that one who aids and abets the pur-
chaser of drugs cannot be convicted of unlawful sale;2 8 the Lott court
222. People v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1975).
223. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 50, at 39-40 ("[T]he Drug War has
achieved a self-perpetuating life of its own, because however irrational it may be as
public policy, it is fully rational as a political and bureaucratic strategy.... It operates
invisibly, obscured by moral and policy rationales."); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The
Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 679, 745 (predicting that drug
sentences "will never be seriously reduced until some future ... president recasts the
debate from crime to economics and declares that the cost of locking up so many drug
sellers for so very long is just too great"); Chapman, supra note 157; Christopher S.
Wren, Drugs Surge as a Campaign Issue, But All the Talk Clarifies Little, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1996, at Al (observing that the fiscal 1997 budget allotted $15.3 billion to
combat drugs, a $2 billion increase over the fiscal 1995 budget).
224. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
226. State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 227, 232 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
227. 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955).
228. See id. at 168.
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simply relied on Moses as precedent and held that one who aids and
abets the purchaser of drugs cannot be convicted of unlawful deliv-
ery.2 9 It is true that the Moses decision was decided under a different
federal act than the one currently in force."3 One could argue, how-
ever, that the difference between the current federal act and the one
at issue in Moses is irrelevant to the Iowa court's ultimate conclusion.
In Moses, the federal statute in question proscribed the illegal sale
of drugs,"' which differs from the current federal law which prohibits
the delivery of drugs. 2  But it has been universally held by federal
and state courts-in addition to Iowa-that the ultimate purchaser of
the drugs cannot be prosecuted for "delivery" or "distribution,"' ' 33 just
as the ultimate purchaser cannot be prosecuted for "sale."' ' In other
words, the ultimate purchaser of the drugs is equally protected from
prosecution for the "sale" of drugs as he or she is for the "delivery" of
drugs. Therefore, if it is acceptable for courts to provide the protec-
tion of the agency defense to individuals who only aid and abet the
ultimate purchaser when the charge is unlawful "sale,"' 35 it should be
equally acceptable for courts to provide identical protection to these
individuals when the charge is aiding and abetting an unlawful "deliv-
ery."2 6 This is because the agency defense is based upon the notion
that an agent can only be guilty for the crime of his principal (the
purchaser).2 7
Granted, the Iowa court did not properly articulate its reasons for
permitting the use of the agency defense in a charge of unlawful deliv-
229. State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa 1977).
230. See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
231. See Moses, 220 F.2d at 167.
232. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 2554(a) (repealed 1970) (cited in Walder v. United
States, 201 F.2d 715, 715 (8th Cir. 1953)) (prohibiting the sale of narcotics), with 21
U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994) (prohibiting the distribution of a controlled substance).
233. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
236. Interestingly, courts have refused to uphold a conviction of unlawful delivery
of a defendant who was only a mere purchaser of the drugs. See supra note 103 and
accompanying text. But the Eighth Circuit described the Controlled Substances Act
as being "all inclusive in covering the entire field of narcotics and dangerous drugs in
all phases of their manufacturing, processing, distribution and use." United States v.
Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). If this language is taken
at face value, then a purchaser of drugs could be convicted of delivery, since the pur-
chaser is well within the "entire field of narcotics." Id. But courts have refused to
expand the definition of "delivery" to include the ultimate purchaser, on the grounds
that it would "write out of the [Controlled Substances] Act the offense of simple pos-
session." United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1977). Because the
Controlled Substances Act is, in fact, not all-inclusive after all, it lends further credi-
bility to the Iowa court's decision in Lott.
237. See People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208,211 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that the theory
of the agency defense is that "one who acts as a procuring agent for the buyer alone is




ery of drugs. When carefully analyzed, however, the argument does
not appear implausible. This argument deserves consideration by
other state courts with similar statutory regimes.
2. Preserving the Defense to Prosecution for Unlawful "Sale" of
Drugs
There are several reasons as to why the agency defense should le-
gally survive in a statutory scheme prohibiting the unlawful sale of
drugs. As the Vermont Supreme Court thoughtfully observed,
"[e]very buyer is, in a sense, a participant in a sale .... But it begs the
point here in issue to say that both become sellers .... ,231 The court
recognized that an agent's mere participation in a sale, in and of itself,
is not enough to sustain a sale conviction when there is no proof that
the agent acted on behalf of the seller.239 As the "thrust" of drug
laws "is not directed against purchasers," 240 courts which hold an
agent of the buyer "to a criminal responsibility that the buyer himself
does not carry" under a sale statute are engaging in a "strained con-
struction" of the statute itself.241
Further, the conviction of a defendant who merely helps the pur-
chaser obtain drugs, and in no way acts on behalf of the seller, appears
to be directly contrary to the theory of aiding and abetting in criminal
law. To see why this is so, it is helpful to first look at the criminal
liability of the ultimate purchasers of drugs. It has been universally
held that purchasers of drugs are not considered to have aided and
abetted the seller.242 Courts have recognized that because state legis-
latures decided to separate the crimes of sale and possession, the pur-
chaser should not share the same level of criminal culpability with the
seller; 43 to hold otherwise would have the effect of "writ[ing] out...
the offense of simple possession. '244 Further, courts have reasoned
that "[i]n a prosecution against the seller, where the statutorily pro-
scribed conduct is the sale of the controlled substance, the buyer's
238. State v. Bressette, 388 A.2d 395, 397 (Vt. 1978).
239. Id. at 398.
240. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 211; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the immense discrepancy between the penalties for sale and possession of
drugs).
241. Bressette, 388 A.2d at 398.
242. See, e.g., 7Tyler v. State, 587 So. 2d 1238, 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (holding
that the purchaser of drugs is not an accomplice to the seller); People v. Edwards, 702
P.2d 555, 559 n.5 (Cal. 1985) (same) (citing People v. Label, 119 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct.
App. 1974)); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 38, at 252-53 (15th ed.
1993) ("A purchaser of narcotics [is not] an accomplice of the person charged with
selling such narcotics." (footnote omitted)).
243. See Tyler, 587 So. 2d at 1242 ("[T]he purchaser is guilty of an offense in-
dependent from the sale."); State v. Dwyer, 172 N.W.2d 591, 596 (N.D. 1969) ("'Sale'
or 'possession' of a narcotic drug under our statutes is each a separate offense.");
supra note 1 and accompanying text (observing the different penalties for possession
and sale).
244. United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1977).
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conduct would be 'inevitably or necessarily incidental' to the sale."24 5
In other words, just as the seller is not an accomplice to the possession
of drugs, the buyer is not an accomplice to the sale.
If purchasers of drugs do not aid and abet sellers, then, neither
should agents of the purchasers be considered aiders and abettors of
the sellers, especially those agents who do not actually handle the
drugs in the transaction. This principle was clearly recognized in
United States v. Moses.24 6 In Moses, the defendant appealed a convic-
tion for the unlawful sale of a controlled substance.247 The evidence
revealed that two undercover officers approached the defendant and
asked her if she could help them obtain some drugs.24s Although the
defendant eventually introduced the officers to an individual who sold
them drugs, she never handled the drugs and played no part in negoti-
ations over the price or quantity of the drugs.249 The district court,
sitting without a jury, found the defendant guilty of sale under these
circumstances;250 it relied on a Congressional statute which states that
one who "commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal." 1
The Third Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction and acquitted
her of all charges. 5 2 The court first observed that in a drug transac-
tion, the government must initially identify "the particular 'offense
against the United States' in which the alleged wrongdoer has partici-
pated," because "the law treats selling and buying as distinct and sepa-
rate offenses";" 3 in other words, "a participant in a particular
transaction must be punished either as a seller or as a buyer."'  The
court next observed that because the government indicted the defend-
ant due to her connection with the crime of selling, her conviction
must stand, "if at all, on her relation to the seller and his illicit enter-
prise.'' 255 The court held that the "undisputed facts" showed that the
defendant acted purely on the request of the undercover officers;
there was no evidence that she was associated in any way with the
245. Tyler, 587 So. 2d at 1242 (quoting Long v. State, 542 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Ark.
1976)); see also State v. Ford, Nos. 95-10-0183, 95-10-0187-0191, 1996 WL 190783, at
*3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1996) ("[T]he act and crime of purchasing drugs is 'inevi-
tably incident' to the sale thereof ...
246. 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955).
247. Id. at 167.
248. Id
249. Id. at 167-68.
250. Id. at 168.
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994) (emphasis added). This statute closely resembles
the aiding and abetting statutes found in state laws. See supra note 5.
252. Moses, 220 F.2d at 169.
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seller.2 56 The court concluded that although the defendant's conduct
"was prefatory to the sale, it was not collaborative with the seller. For
this reason, the conviction cannot be sustained. 12 57
Although Moses was decided under a federal narcotics statute dif-
ferent than the one currently in force, its analysis in regard to statutes
prohibiting the unlawful sale of drugs is clearly applicable today. Var-
ious state cases have recognized this principle, refusing to uphold sale
convictions for agents of purchasers who did not aid and abet the
seller.258 Unfortunately, however, other courts have committed an
unwarranted expansion of the application of aiding and abetting stat-
utes by upholding sale convictions for defendants who admittedly par-
ticipated in a drug transaction, but did not handle the drugs and
merely aided and abetted the purchaser. 259 This approach, which only
looks at whether the defendant "caused" the purchase and fails to an-
alyze the agent's relationship with the seller, is a misconstruction of
aiding and abetting statutes.26 °
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Owes v. State, 638 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) ("[T]he par-
ticipation of a defendant in, or his or her criminal linkage with, the sale is the basis of
criminal liability, and not the actual act of the defendant in physically transferring the
controlled substance to the buyer." (quoting Martin v. Alabama, 730 F.2d 721, 724
(11th Cir. 1984))); People v. Cierzniewski, 529 N.Y.S.2d 886, 886-87 (App. Div. 1988);
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169, 173 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) ("Although ... one who
'aids and abets' is a principal in a crime, a conviction cannot be obtained if there is 'no
proof of a conspiracy or prearranged plan' between the alleged abettor and the one
who actually commits the crime." (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 387
A.2d 1268, 1271 (Pa. 1978); State v. Catterall, 486 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Wash. Ct. App.
1971).
Although California does not recognize the agency defense, see People v. Reyes, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1992), it at least recognizes that a defendant must
"facilitate" a drug transaction before he or she can be convicted of aiding and abet-
ting a sale of drugs. See id. at 49 (holding that, in a case involving the sale of cocaine,
the "[d]efendant was prosecuted primarily on an aiding and abetting theory, and
under the law of accomplice liability the jury should have been required to find that
he intended to facilitate or encourage the sale").
259. See Wallace v. State, 344 S.E.2d 770, 770-71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Da-
vis, 695 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Me. 1997); State v. Grilli, 230 N.W.2d 445, 449-50 (Minn.
1975); Johnson v. State, 642 So. 2d 924, 927 (Miss. 1994); State v. Poplin, 289 S.E.2d
124, 130 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
260. See Grace E. Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 2169, 2171 (1988) ("In most instances, the law requires more than simple 'but
for' causation."). In Flowers, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania firmly rejected the
causation approach to aiding and abetting in a narcotics case. The defendant ap-
pealed his conviction for unlawful sale of a controlled substance. Flowers, 387 A.2d at
1269. The evidence revealed that an undercover agent made a request to the defend-
ant for narcotics; the defendant admitted that he did not have any. Id. at 1270. When
a third party, George Shiner, approached the defendant, the defendant called the
agent over and introduced Shiner to the officer. Id. The three people then drove in a
car to Shiner's residence, where the officer eventually purchased marijuana. Id.
Although the defendant was present at the transaction, he did not handle any money
or drugs, and he had no involvement in the negotiations. Id. Both the trial court and
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania sustained the defendant's convictions, reasoning
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A poignant example of this inappropriate reasoning is the Florida
case of State v. Dent.26 In Dent, the defendant appealed a conviction
for the sale of cocaine.262 The evidence showed that the defendant
arranged a drug transaction between an undercover officer and a drug
seller;263 as in Moses,2 4 the defendant did not actually handle the
drugs being sold, but was merely present at the exchange.26 The
court found the defendant liable for the sale, relying on its aiding and
abetting statute.266 In reaching its conclusion, the court held that "the
evidence is undisputed that the sales would not have occurred but for
[defendant's] arrangements." 267
What the Dent court and others fail to recognize is that accomplice
statutes do not penalize the aiding and abetting of the commission of a
crime in general; rather, they penalize the aiding and abetting of a
principal to a crime. 6 In other words, the government must identify
"the particular 'offense. . .' in which the alleged wrongdoer has partic-
ipated" by identifying which individual the defendant is allegedly con-
nected with;2 69 to do otherwise is simply a misapplication of aiding
and abetting law.27°
that if the defendant had not brought the buyer and the seller together, the sale would
never have occurred; thus, the conviction for aiding and abetting the seller could
stand "without regard to whether [defendant] had any connection whatsoever with
either the seller or his plans." Id.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized this flawed logic and reversed the
defendant's conviction. The court observed that "the causation test has been firmly
rejected," id. at 1271, and that the lower courts, by "taking a causative approach and
applying a 'but-for' test .... expressly rejected any consideration of the intent of the
parties in their commission of the acts involved." Id. at 1270. In order to convict the
defendant as an accomplice to the seller, "it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an active partner in the intent to make
this sale." Id. at 1271. The court then found that "[n]one of the evidence proves be-
yond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] had any interest whatsoever in whether this
sale ever took place." Id The court concluded that "[i]f [defendant] can be said to
have assisted anyone, it was the buyer, not the seller." Id. at 1272 (emphasis added).
261. 322 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1975).
262. Id
263. Id
264. 220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955).
265. See Dent, 322 So. 2d at 544.
266. Id. at 544; see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.011 (West Supp. 1998) (formerly codified at
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.011) (aiding & abetting statute).
267. Dent, 322 So. 2d at 544.
268. See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 363 (1991) (-[A] principal
is a person whose acts fall within the legal definition of the crime, whereas an accom-
plice . . . is anyone who aids, abets, counsels, or procures a principal." (emphasis
added)); H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honor6, Causation in the Law 344 (1959) ("The usual
case [of aiding and abetting] is intentionally providing the means or opportunity for
the principal's act." (footnote omitted)); 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 167 (1981)
("An aider or abettor is one who advises, counsels, procures, or encourages another
to commit a crime." (footnote omitted)).
269. Moses, 220 F.2d at 168.
270. See supra notes 259-60, 268 and accompanying text.
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That the causation approach is improper is especially evident when
one considers that the ultimate purchaser of drugs technically "aids
and abets" the seller in the sale of drugs by negotiating with the seller
and buying the drugs;2 71 in other words, the sale would not have oc-
curred but for the buyer. Nevertheless, the purchaser is not punished
as an accomplice to the seller.272 In drug cases, therefore, courts
should not apply "a test of causation, but a test of partnership or con-
cert of action to determine guilt as an accessory. 2 73 Because the
agency defense is based on such a partnership test, it assures that
courts will apply aiding and abetting law in the proper manner.
CONCLUSION
Predictions that the agency defense is "heading towards extinction
in national American law '2 74 have been premature. The agency de-
fense is alive and well, in both New York2 75 and a number of addi-
271. See State v. Catterall, 486 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) ("As a matter
of abstract logic, [the] cooperation [between the buyer and the seller] requires that
the purchaser aid or abet the seller in making the sale.").
272. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. In Morei v. United States, 127
F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942), the "oft-cited opinion" of the Sixth Circuit, Commonwealth
v. Flowers, 387 A.2d 1268, 1271 (Pa. 1978), the court recognized the inherent
problems in the "causation" approach to accomplice liability:
If the criterion for holding that one is guilty of procuring the commission of
an offense, is that the offense would not have been committed except for
such a person's conduct or revelation of information, it would open a vast
field of offenses that have never been comprehended within the common law
by aiding, abetting, inducing or procuring.
Morei, 127 F.2d at 831 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit clearly recognized that a
causation approach to aiding and abetting would lead to ludicrous conclusions.
273. Flowers, 387 A.2d at 1270. Of course, if the evidence in a narcotics case does,
in fact, establish that the defendant aided and abetted the seller during the commis-
sion of the sale, a conviction for unlawful sale is appropriate. See, e.g., People v. Arm-
strong, 553 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (App. Div. 1990) (finding that defendant had
"accessorial liability" with the co-defendant for unlawful sale when the defendant
brought the buyer to the seller and served as a lookout and guard during the comple-
tion of the sale).
274. William C. Donnino & Anthony J. Girese, The Agency Defense in Drug Cases,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1978, at 1.
275. The New York Court of Appeals has thoroughly articulated a set of conditions
which must be considered to determine whether the agency defense should be applied
in a given case. For instance, the court developed a comprehensive list of factors to
decide whether a defendant has exhibited "[s]alesman-like behavior," which would
"[connote] an interest that goes beyond representation of the buyer alone" and pre-
clude the defendant's right to use the agency defense. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d
208, 212 (N.Y. 1978). These factors include considering whether the defendant touted
the quality of the drug, id., bargained over price, id., suggested the purchase to the
buyer, People v. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200, 207 (N.Y. 1978), or apologized for
the quality of the drugs or the manner of their delivery. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 212.
Other elements of "salesman-like behavior" include the prior relationship between
the defendant and the buyer, Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 207, and the defendant's
prior relationships with narcotics in general. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 212. Further, a
court may consider the amount of time a defendant took to complete the drug trans-
action. See People v. Leybovich, 607 N.Y.S.2d 982, 983 (App. Div. 1994) (finding that
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tional states. Without question, the Controlled Substances Act
contributed to the demise of the defense in many jurisdictions. The
defense's numerous culpability and legal justifications, however, are
compelling enough to support its complete revival. To assure an over-
all sense of integrity and uprightness in the criminal justice system,
state courts that have not yet adopted the agency defense should do
so. By so doing, the courts will guarantee that purchasing agents re-
ceive the punishment they deserve.
the defendant's ability to complete a drug transaction with an undercover officer
within several minutes indicated that he was "at the very least, a middleman if not an
independent seller").
1998] 2691
Notes & Observations
